A 2010 international report reveals Félix Ulloa’s earlier involvement in research on Haiti’s electoral institutions. Sixteen years later, the Salvadoran vice president is organizing a conference bringing together former Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, current Haitian officials, and international political figures as El Salvador’s military involvement in Haiti raises new questions.

HAITI POLITIC | SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

November 15, 2026

INTRODUCTION: THE CONNECTION GOES BACK FURTHER THAN EXPECTED

When Haiti’s government announced on November 15 that Justice and Public Security Minister Patrick Pélissier was traveling to El Salvador for the second International Conference on the State and Democracy (CIED), the announcement appeared to concern an ordinary diplomatic event.

But a closer examination of historical documents and the conference’s official program reveals a much longer relationship between Salvadoran Vice President Félix Ulloa and Haiti’s political institutions.

The connection does not begin with President Nayib Bukele.

It does not begin with the Gang Suppression Force.

And it does not begin with the first CIED conference in November 2024.

A report published by the International Crisis Group on October 27, 2010, identifies Félix Ulloa as an author of research concerning Haiti’s electoral system dating back to 2005.

That discovery adds a new historical dimension to Haiti’s relationship with Salvadoran political figures.

The same report describes the political environment surrounding Haiti’s disputed 2010 presidential election, the Préval administration, the emergence of Michel Martelly, the role of international organizations, and the institutional weaknesses affecting Haitian democracy.

Sixteen years later, Ulloa is vice president of El Salvador.

His government is promoting its security and governance model internationally.

And the official program for CIED 2026 includes a panel specifically dedicated to Haiti, with Jean-Max Bellerive, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, and former deputy Jerry Tardieu listed among its participants.

These facts raise an important question:

How did a Salvadoran political figure who studied Haiti’s electoral institutions become a central organizer of international governance conferences involving Haitian political leaders during a period of expanding Salvadoran security operations in Haiti?

The answer requires examining the historical record without confusing documented relationships with unproven political coordination.

1. THE 2010 DOCUMENT: FÉLIX ULLOA’S EARLIER CONNECTION TO HAITI

On October 27, 2010, the International Crisis Group published Report No. 35:

Haiti: The Stakes of the Post-Quake Elections.

The report examined the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for November 28, 2010.

It warned that Haiti’s electoral institutions faced serious problems involving political interference, public distrust, weak administration, security threats, and dependence on international assistance.

But buried in the report’s references is an important name.

Félix Ulloa.

The report cites Ulloa’s introduction to a 2007 National Democratic Institute publication on Haitian political parties and political representation.

It also cites his 2005 research, Haiti: Cost of Registration and Elections, produced in connection with the IFES–UNDP Cost of Registration and Elections project.

These references establish that Ulloa had contributed to published research concerning Haiti’s electoral institutions long before becoming El Salvador’s vice president.

They do not establish that he controlled Haiti’s elections, participated in the 2010 vote-counting process, or influenced the selection of presidential candidates.

Nevertheless, the historical connection is significant.

It places Ulloa within the broader international policy environment surrounding Haitian electoral reform.

The organizations involved

The 2010 Crisis Group report identifies several international institutions providing electoral assistance to Haiti.

They included the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization of American States (OAS), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and Elections Canada.

The report also identifies the United States, Canada, Brazil, and the European Union as major donors.

The distinction is important: Ulloa’s cited research establishes an intellectual and professional connection to Haitian electoral questions, not proof that he acted on behalf of every institution involved in the elections.

2. THE PRÉVAL–BELLERIVE ADMINISTRATION AND THE 2010 ELECTORAL CRISIS

The 2010 election took place during one of the most difficult periods in Haiti’s history.

The January earthquake had devastated Port-au-Prince, destroyed government infrastructure, and displaced approximately 1.5 million people.

President René Préval was approaching the end of his second presidential term.

Jean-Max Bellerive was prime minister.

The government faced enormous pressure to organize elections while managing humanitarian relief and reconstruction.

The International Crisis Group report warned that the Provisional Electoral Council lacked broad public confidence.

Opposition parties accused the electoral authorities of favoring Préval’s political interests.

Préval denied wrongdoing.

The report also documented concerns about the exclusion of political organizations, voter registration, electoral financing, and international involvement.

The succession question

Préval’s political movement, INITE, selected Jude Célestin as its presidential candidate.

The report described Célestin as a leading contender because of Préval’s endorsement.

Michel Martelly, meanwhile, entered the election as a political newcomer.

Mirlande Manigat was another major candidate.

At the time the report was published, the eventual electoral outcome remained unknown.

The report therefore provides evidence of the political conditions preceding the disputed election—not a retrospective finding about who ultimately determined its result.

3. HILLARY CLINTON, THE OAS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The 2010 Crisis Group report demonstrates how deeply international institutions were involved in Haiti’s electoral preparations.

It identifies the OAS and CARICOM as leaders of the international observation mission.

It describes assistance from MINUSTAH, UNDP, IFES, NDI, and Elections Canada.

It also notes that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton supported holding elections as part of Haiti’s political stabilization and reconstruction process.

However, the report was published before the November 2010 vote and the subsequent January 2011 electoral controversy.

It therefore cannot establish what happened during Clinton’s January 2011 visit or the later dispute involving Jude Célestin, Mirlande Manigat, and Michel Martelly.

Those events require separate contemporary documentation.

The broader historical record documents significant U.S. and OAS involvement in the electoral dispute.

But the stronger allegation that Clinton personally selected Martelly as president should not be presented as an established fact without specific supporting evidence.

The relevant question is how international pressure, electoral review procedures, and Haitian political decisions interacted during the transition.

4. JEAN-MAX BELLERIVE: FROM PRÉVAL TO MARTELLY

Jean-Max Bellerive occupies an important position in this political history.

He served as Minister of Planning and External Cooperation under René Préval.

In October 2009, Préval appointed him prime minister.

Bellerive remained in office during the January 2010 earthquake and the reconstruction period.

He co-chaired the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission alongside former U.S. President Bill Clinton.

When Michel Martelly became president in May 2011, Bellerive remained prime minister until October.

His relationship with Martelly continued afterward.

Congressional Research Service reporting states that Bellerive subsequently served as an adviser to Martelly.

This establishes a political connection across two presidential administrations.

Bellerive’s public record also includes controversies concerning post-earthquake reconstruction contracts.

In December 2023, the U.S. State Department publicly designated him for involvement in significant corruption.

That designation was an administrative measure, not a criminal conviction.

None of these facts establishes that Bellerive participated in an undisclosed Salvadoran security agreement.

But they help explain why his involvement in the CIED conferences warrants scrutiny.

5. THE FIRST CIED CONFERENCE: NOVEMBER 2024

The first International Conference on the State and Democracy took place in San Salvador on November 26–27, 2024.

It was organized under the leadership of Vice President Félix Ulloa.

According to the Salvadoran presidency, more than 1,000 people attended.

The event addressed public security, economic development, education, health, technological modernization, and democratic governance.

But its political purpose was also apparent.

The Salvadoran government used the conference to present President Nayib Bukele’s policies as an example of national transformation.

Ulloa argued that international participants should examine El Salvador’s experience directly rather than rely solely on critical accounts from outside the country.

The government promoted its Territorial Control Plan and anti-gang operations as major security achievements.

Independent critics continued to raise concerns about emergency powers, detention practices, due process, and democratic safeguards.

Bellerive’s participation

Jean-Max Bellerive participated in the 2024 conference.

Contemporaneous reporting identified him in discussions involving humanitarian assistance, governance, violence prevention, and international cooperation.

That establishes a direct connection between Bellerive and the Salvadoran government’s international governance forum.

However, available reporting does not establish that he negotiated a security deployment or represented Michel Martelly at the event.

6. THE SECOND CIED: A HAITI-FOCUSED PANEL APPEARS ON THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM

The second CIED is scheduled for November 16–17, 2026.

Its official website, cied.sv, provides a detailed program.

One of the most significant entries is a panel titled:

“Haití, un país en permanente construcción” — “Haiti, a Country in Permanent Construction.”

The published program lists:

Pascal Drouhaud — Moderator and international relations specialist.

Alix Didier Fils-Aimé — Prime Minister of Haiti.

Jean-Max Bellerive — Former Prime Minister of Haiti.

Jerry Tardieu — Haitian politician and academic.

David Rivard — Executive director of El Salvador’s Agency for Nation Development and Design.

Dong Nguyen Huu — Human-rights specialist.

The panel is scheduled for November 17.

This is an important development.

Bellerive is not merely associated with the first CIED conference.

His name also appears on the official published program for the second conference.

That does not prove he will attend.

Conference programs can change, and Haiti’s November 15 announcement identifies Patrick Pélissier as the prime minister’s representative.

The discrepancy between the published program and the Haitian government’s travel announcement requires clarification.

Will Bellerive participate?

Will Fils-Aimé attend?

Will Pélissier replace the prime minister on the panel?

And what subjects will be discussed during the Haiti session?

These questions are particularly important because the panel includes political figures from different periods of Haiti’s recent history.

7. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC JOINS THE DISCUSSION

Another development makes the second conference more consequential.

On November 15, 2026, the Dominican presidency announced that Vice President Raquel Peña would travel to El Salvador.

She is scheduled to address democratic institutions, governance, and regional cooperation.

The Dominican government specifically identified Haiti’s security crisis as one of the issues she would discuss.

It also announced a bilateral meeting between Peña and Félix Ulloa.

This confirms that Haiti’s security situation is not merely an incidental subject at CIED 2026.

It is part of the announced regional diplomatic agenda.

The Dominican Republic shares a border with Haiti and has repeatedly called for stronger international responses to Haitian gang violence.

Its participation creates another opportunity for regional security discussions.

However, the announced bilateral meeting concerns the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. It does not establish that Haitian officials are participating in those particular talks.

8. PATRICK PÉLISSIER AND THE QUESTION OF HAITI’S REPRESENTATION

Haiti’s Prime Minister’s Office announced on November 15 that Justice Minister Patrick Pélissier was traveling to San Salvador.

He is representing Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

The announcement described the conference as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation concerning governance, security, and development.

But the published CIED program still lists Fils-Aimé as a participant in the Haiti-focused panel.

The government has not publicly reconciled these two accounts in the material reviewed for this investigation.

This raises questions about the delegation’s final composition and its diplomatic objectives.

Will Pélissier participate in the Haiti panel?

Will Bellerive and Jerry Tardieu attend?

Will the delegation hold bilateral meetings with Salvadoran security officials?

Will any agreements be announced?

Haiti’s government should publish its final delegation list and meeting agenda.

9. THE SALVADORAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENT: THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE

The timing of CIED 2026 is particularly significant because of El Salvador’s reported military involvement in Haiti.

On November 10, the Associated Press reported that Prime Minister Fils-Aimé was expected to visit El Salvador to discuss the future of Salvadoran troops operating in Haiti.

The report described an ongoing Salvadoran deployment and raised questions about the agreement governing those operations.

It also described disputes concerning missing Salvadoran personnel and the conduct of anti-gang operations.

These reports make the second CIED conference more than a routine diplomatic event for Haiti.

The Salvadoran government is promoting its domestic security model while its personnel are reportedly participating in operations abroad.

The public deserves to know how those two activities relate.

Questions concerning the deployment

What is the legal basis for Salvadoran operations in Haiti?

Who authorized the deployment?

Who exercises operational command?

How long will the deployment last?

Who pays for transportation, equipment, salaries, logistics, and medical support?

What rules govern the use of force?

What mechanisms investigate civilian harm or misconduct?

How does the deployment relate to the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force?

And what role does Haiti’s government play in approving operations?

These are questions of constitutional authority and public accountability.

They are not accusations that the deployment is unlawful.

The precise terms must be examined before reaching a legal conclusion.

10. THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION: 2005–2026

The evidence now establishes a longer chronology than previously recognized.

2005: Félix Ulloa authors research concerning the cost of voter registration and elections in Haiti, cited by the International Crisis Group.

2007: Ulloa contributes an introduction to research concerning Haitian political parties and representation.

2009: René Préval appoints Jean-Max Bellerive prime minister.

2010: The International Crisis Group publishes its report on Haiti’s post-earthquake elections, citing Ulloa’s earlier work.

2010–2011: Haiti experiences a disputed presidential election involving Jude Célestin, Mirlande Manigat, and Michel Martelly.

2011: Bellerive remains prime minister during Martelly’s initial months in office and later reportedly becomes an adviser.

2023: The U.S. State Department publicly designates Bellerive in connection with significant corruption.

November 2024: Bellerive participates in the first CIED conference organized under Ulloa’s leadership.

November 2026: Bellerive, Fils-Aimé, and Jerry Tardieu appear on the official program for the second CIED.

November 15, 2026: Haiti announces that Patrick Pélissier is traveling to the conference as the prime minister’s representative.

November 15, 2026: The Dominican Republic confirms Raquel Peña’s participation and announces discussions involving Haiti’s security crisis.

The chronology reveals recurring institutional and diplomatic connections.

But it does not establish a continuous political alliance, secret coordination, or an agreement linking Ulloa, Bellerive, Martelly, and the current Salvadoran deployment.

11. WHY FÉLIX ULLOA DESERVES CLOSER EXAMINATION

The discovery of Ulloa’s earlier research on Haiti is particularly significant.

It demonstrates that the Salvadoran vice president was familiar with Haiti’s electoral challenges long before the Bukele administration’s recent international security initiatives.

His work concerned electoral administration, political parties, and institutional reform.

Today, his office organizes international conferences discussing democracy, security, and governance.

Those subjects are related, but the relationship should not be overstated.

Researching Haiti’s electoral institutions in 2005 does not establish involvement in Haiti’s 2010 electoral controversy.

Nor does organizing CIED establish responsibility for negotiating the current security deployment.

Nevertheless, Ulloa’s long-standing interest in Haitian governance makes him an important figure in understanding the history of Haiti–El Salvador institutional contacts.

The next investigative step should be to obtain his original publications and determine whether he participated in subsequent Haiti-related electoral or governance projects.

12. QUESTIONS FOR JEAN-MAX BELLERIVE

Bellerive should be asked:

First: Who invited you to the first CIED conference in November 2024?

Second: Did you meet Félix Ulloa or Salvadoran security officials outside the conference sessions?

Third: What subjects did you discuss concerning Haiti’s political and security situation?

Fourth: Are you participating in CIED 2026, as indicated by the official program?

Fifth: Have you advised Haiti’s current government or Salvadoran officials on security cooperation?

Sixth: Did your previous relationship with Michel Martelly play any role in your participation in either conference?

These are requests for clarification, not allegations of misconduct.

13. QUESTIONS FOR FÉLIX ULLOA

The Salvadoran vice president should also answer several questions.

What was the extent of his professional involvement in Haitian electoral research during the 2000s?

Did he undertake additional projects involving Haiti after 2007?

What criteria were used to invite Bellerive to CIED 2024?

Why was Bellerive included in the published 2026 program?

Who selected the Haitian participants?

What is the purpose of the Haiti-focused panel?

And will any discussions surrounding the conference concern the future of Salvadoran security operations in Haiti?

These questions would help establish whether CIED is primarily a forum for public policy exchange or also serves as a setting for substantive bilateral negotiations.

CONCLUSION: A LONGER HISTORY, BUT STILL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The newly examined evidence changes the chronology of Haiti’s relationship with Félix Ulloa.

His documented involvement in research concerning Haiti’s electoral institutions dates back at least to 2005.

In 2010, the International Crisis Group cited that work while examining the political environment surrounding Haiti’s disputed presidential election.

Jean-Max Bellerive served as prime minister during that period.

He subsequently remained in office under Michel Martelly and reportedly became an adviser to the new president.

In November 2024, Bellerive participated in El Salvador’s first CIED conference.

Now, his name appears on the official program for the second conference, alongside current and former Haitian political figures.

Meanwhile, Haiti’s government is sending Justice Minister Patrick Pélissier to San Salvador, and the Dominican Republic has announced discussions involving Haiti’s security crisis.

The connections are documented.

Their political significance deserves investigation.

But the evidence does not yet demonstrate that the conferences were used to negotiate Salvadoran military operations, that Bellerive acted on behalf of Martelly, or that Ulloa exercised improper influence over Haitian elections.

THE QUESTION HAITI POLITIC IS ASKING

FROM FÉLIX ULLOA’S EARLY RESEARCH ON HAITI’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM TO JEAN-MAX BELLERIVE’S PARTICIPATION IN EL SALVADOR’S DEMOCRACY CONFERENCES, HOW HAVE THESE LONG-STANDING POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS EVOLVED—AND WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, DO THEY PLAY IN HAITI’S CURRENT SECURITY DIPLOMACY?

The answer must come from documents, official records, meeting agendas, agreements, and direct responses from the individuals involved.

Haiti’s political future cannot be evaluated solely through international conferences or foreign security promises.

It must also be measured by the ability of Haitian institutions to exercise lawful authority, protect citizens, conduct credible elections, and account for decisions made in the country’s name.

HAITI POLITIC — INVESTIGATING THE CONNECTIONS, QUESTIONING THE POWER, FOLLOWING THE EVIDENCE.