From the Martelly–Lamothe Administration to the Fils-Aimé Government: Who Signed Away a Decade of Customs-Revenue Opportunities, Who Stands to Benefit, and Who Will Answer to the Haitian People?
HAITI POLITIC — SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
November 17, 2026
Four Haitian government ministers, a foreign consortium represented by an Australian businessman, and a ten-year agreement involving customs revenue, border surveillance and national security. Behind the Evergreen contract lies a larger investigation into Haiti’s political networks, public finances, foreign contractors and the responsibilities of successive governments.
INTRODUCTION: A $542 MILLION AGREEMENT AND FOUR FAMILIAR NAMES
On February 4, 2026, the Haitian government entered into a major agreement with the Evergreen/ENSE Group consortium to modernize the country’s customs and immigration systems and strengthen border security.
The agreement was concluded under the administration of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
According to a March 4, 2026, investigation published by Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), four Haitian ministers represented the government in signing the contract:
Alfred Fils Métellus, then minister of economy and finance.
Patrick Pélissier, minister of justice and public security.
Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé, minister of the interior and territorial communities.
Jean-Michel Moïse, then minister of defense.
On the private-sector side, the consortium was represented by Vincent Roy Gordon, identified in the FJKL report as an Australian passport holder representing Evergreen Trading System Limited, a company registered in the United Arab Emirates.
The agreement reportedly involves approximately US$542.6 million in proposed investments and contractual commitments over ten years.
But the financial arrangements described by FJKL raise a much larger question:
Could the Haitian government end up paying a foreign consortium substantially more than the headline contract value through fees tied to imports and customs revenue?
And why did four ministers from different political backgrounds agree to a long-term arrangement involving some of Haiti’s most important sovereign functions?
To understand the controversy, it is necessary to examine both the contract and the political histories of the officials who signed it.
PART I — WHAT IS EVERGREEN TRADING SYSTEM LIMITED?
1. A FOREIGN CONSORTIUM ENTERS HAITI’S CUSTOMS SYSTEM
Evergreen Trading System Limited is identified as the lead representative of a consortium involved in customs modernization and border-security services.
Reporting on the project identifies several participating companies:
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Evergreen Trading System Limited.
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Alex Stewart International.
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ENSE Group.
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SecuriPort.
The proposed services include customs modernization, border surveillance, inspection equipment, immigration systems, technical training and security infrastructure.
The project is intended to cover land borders, seaports, airports and other strategic facilities.
These are not ordinary commercial services.
They concern essential government functions, including the inspection of imported goods, enforcement of customs laws, control of international borders and protection of national security information.
That is why the legal and financial terms of the agreement deserve exceptional scrutiny.
Who owns Evergreen?
The company’s ultimate beneficial owners have not been conclusively established through the public corporate records reviewed for this investigation.
FJKL identifies the company as registered in the United Arab Emirates and names Vincent Roy Gordon as its representative.
However, representing a company in a government contract is not the same as owning it.
The Haitian public still needs to know:
Who are Evergreen’s shareholders?
Who are its ultimate beneficial owners?
Does another company exercise control over Evergreen?
Who negotiated the agreement on behalf of the consortium?
And were the identities of the company’s beneficial owners disclosed to Haitian procurement authorities?
A contract affecting Haiti’s customs revenue should not leave the public uncertain about the ultimate ownership of the company receiving the payments.
PART II — WHO IS VINCENT ROY GORDON?
2. THE AUSTRALIAN BUSINESSMAN REPRESENTING EVERGREEN
Vincent Roy Gordon is identified in FJKL’s report as the representative of Evergreen in the February 2026 agreement.
The report describes him as an Australian passport holder.
It also identifies Evergreen as a company constituted under the laws of the United Arab Emirates.
However, important questions about Gordon’s professional background remain unresolved.
His complete corporate history has not been independently established.
His ownership interest in Evergreen, if any, remains unverified.
His previous government contracts and commercial activities require further examination.
The reported Erik Prince connection
Some reporting has linked the Evergreen consortium to business networks associated with Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater.
Prince has separately been associated with private security operations in Haiti.
However, the available reporting does not establish that Prince owns Evergreen or that he personally negotiated the February 2026 customs agreement.
A corporate relationship must be demonstrated through ownership records, contractual documents or other verifiable evidence.
Haiti Politic therefore treats the reported Prince connection as an unresolved investigative lead, not an established ownership finding.
The distinction matters because Haiti has entered into separate arrangements involving foreign security contractors.
Those agreements should not automatically be treated as one operation simply because they concern security or share reported business connections.
PART III — THE FOUR MINISTERS WHO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT
3. ALFRED FILS MÉTELLUS: THE MARTELLY–LAMOTHE CONNECTION
Former Minister of Economy and Finance
Alfred Fils Métellus has one of the most significant historical connections to the Michel Martelly administration among the four signatories.
His professional career in public finance began before Martelly’s presidency.
Between 2009 and 2013, he held senior administrative responsibilities in Haiti’s economic and financial institutions.
His career therefore extended across the administrations of René Préval and Michel Martelly.
Secretary of state under Michel Martelly
In April 2014, Métellus became secretary of state for the economy under President Michel Martelly and Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe.
This establishes a direct political-administrative connection to the Martelly–Lamothe government.
It does not, by itself, establish formal membership in the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK).
His dismissal in July 2014
Métellus’s tenure as secretary of state was relatively brief.
In July 2014, he was removed from the position.
Contemporaneous reporting attributed the decision to the Martelly–Lamothe administration.
The publicly available account does not establish that his departure resulted from corruption.
Nevertheless, the circumstances of his appointment and dismissal deserve historical examination.
Who supported his appointment?
Why did the government remove him after approximately three months?
What professional or political relationships did he maintain with officials from that administration afterward?
These questions are relevant to understanding his political network.
They do not establish misconduct.
His return to government in 2024
In November 2024, Métellus became minister of economy and finance under Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
He returned to government after years of professional involvement in economic administration and international development finance.
His career also included work connected to the Inter-American Development Bank.
This experience placed him in a position to evaluate major financial agreements.
His responsibility for Evergreen
According to FJKL, Métellus represented the Ministry of Economy and Finance when the Evergreen agreement was signed.
That makes his role particularly important.
The contract reportedly includes payments tied to the value of imports and customs collections.
Such provisions could create long-term financial obligations for the Haitian state.
Why did the Ministry of Economy and Finance approve a revenue-sharing arrangement with a foreign contractor rather than a conventional equipment procurement and technical-assistance program?
Did Métellus’s ministry conduct an independent financial analysis?
Did it compare the projected cost of Evergreen’s services with the cost of strengthening Haitian Customs directly?
Did it calculate how much Evergreen could receive if customs revenue continued increasing?
Those are central questions for the former finance minister.
Political affiliation finding
Confirmed: Senior service under the Préval, Martelly–Lamothe and Fils-Aimé administrations.
Not established: Formal PHTK membership or participation by Martelly in the Evergreen negotiations.
PART IV — PATRICK PÉLISSIER: JUSTICE, SECURITY AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
4. THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Patrick Pélissier became minister of justice and public security in November 2024 under Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
His most clearly documented political association is therefore with the Fils-Aimé government.
No reliable evidence reviewed for this investigation establishes formal membership in PHTK, INITE, Fanmi Lavalas or another Haitian political party.
Why his signature matters
The Evergreen contract reportedly involves border surveillance, immigration systems and security operations.
These activities raise legal questions about the delegation of government authority to private contractors.
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has an important institutional interest in ensuring that security-related arrangements comply with Haitian law.
The relevant questions include:
Can a private foreign company exercise functions normally reserved for Haitian public authorities?
What legal authority permits such an arrangement?
What safeguards protect citizens’ information?
Who supervises private contractors working with security institutions?
And what remedies exist if the contractor fails to fulfill its obligations?
Public controversies during his tenure
During Pélissier’s tenure, Haitian anti-corruption organizations raised concerns involving justice-sector oversight, procurement and the handling of corruption investigations.
Those concerns form part of the public record surrounding the ministry.
However, they do not establish that Pélissier personally committed corruption.
No verified criminal conviction involving his participation in Evergreen was established in this review.
The question for Pélissier
What legal opinion did the Ministry of Justice provide before the government committed itself to a ten-year agreement involving border-security and customs functions?
The answer should be documented.
It should not depend solely on political statements.
PART V — PAUL ANTOINE BIEN-AIMÉ: THE PRÉVAL CONNECTION
5. A LONGTIME GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL RETURNS TO THE INTERIOR MINISTRY
Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé has a public-service career extending across several Haitian administrations.
He served as minister of national education in 1999.
He later became minister of the interior during René Préval’s second presidency.
He returned to the Interior Ministry in November 2024 under Prime Minister Fils-Aimé.
Historical political associations
Bien-Aimé’s political history has been associated in published accounts with movements such as PANPRA and INITE.
However, the dates and nature of those reported affiliations require additional documentary verification.
His service under René Préval is established.
His formal membership in particular political organizations should not be assumed solely from his cabinet appointments.
Why the Interior Ministry matters
The Ministry of the Interior has responsibilities involving territorial administration and immigration.
The Evergreen agreement reportedly covers immigration systems and border-management infrastructure.
Consequently, Bien-Aimé’s ministry would have an institutional interest in the project’s design and implementation.
The questions are substantial.
Would Evergreen receive access to immigration databases?
Would its employees participate in border-control operations?
Who would maintain the technology?
Could the Haitian government operate the system independently after the contract ended?
And what would happen if the contractor withdrew before the expiration of the agreement?
The question for Bien-Aimé
Why did the government consider a foreign consortium necessary to modernize functions that Haitian institutions are legally responsible for administering?
His long experience in government makes that question especially relevant.
Political affiliation finding
Confirmed: Previous service under René Préval and later under Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
Reported but not conclusively verified: Historical PANPRA and INITE affiliations.
Not established: Formal PHTK membership.
PART VI — JEAN-MICHEL MOÏSE: FROM PARLIAMENT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY
6. THE FORMER DEPUTY WHO SIGNED THE EVERGREEN AGREEMENT
Jean-Michel Moïse previously served in Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies.
Official electoral records identify him as having been elected in the Nord-Ouest department under the political-party abbreviation PF, associated with the Federalist Party.
He later became minister of defense in November 2024.
He held that position when the Evergreen agreement was signed in February 2026.
Mario Andrésol subsequently replaced him as defense minister in March 2026.
Was he a PHTK deputy?
His official electoral affiliation was PF, not PHTK.
His election occurred during Michel Martelly’s presidency, but that fact does not establish that he belonged to Martelly’s party.
Any alliance with PHTK would need to be demonstrated separately.
Controversies involving the Defense Ministry
Moïse’s ministerial tenure attracted public scrutiny concerning defense procurement and spending.
Reporting raised questions about proposed contracts and the ministry’s financial management.
Other published allegations concerned the distribution of ministry funds.
These allegations require independent verification.
They should not be presented as established findings of personal corruption.
No final judicial determination establishing that Moïse personally misappropriated funds was identified in the materials reviewed for this investigation.
Why his Evergreen signature matters
The Evergreen agreement reportedly includes equipment intended for border surveillance and security operations.
Among the proposed acquisitions described by FJKL are helicopters, patrol vessels, tactical vehicles and drones.
The Ministry of Defense therefore had a direct institutional interest in the agreement.
But important questions remain.
Did the Haitian Armed Forces participate in identifying the equipment required?
Were alternative suppliers considered?
Were prices independently verified?
Would the military own and maintain the equipment?
And why was the government prepared to enter a long-term arrangement with a foreign consortium instead of purchasing equipment directly?
Political affiliation finding
Confirmed: Former deputy elected under PF and later defense minister under Fils-Aimé.
Not established: Formal PHTK membership or a direct role for Martelly in the Evergreen agreement.
PART VII — WHAT CONNECTS THE FOUR MINISTERS?
7. DIFFERENT POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS, ONE GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT
The four officials did not enter government through identical political paths.
Alfred Fils Métellus served under Michel Martelly and Laurent Lamothe.
Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé previously served under René Préval.
Jean-Michel Moïse was elected to Parliament under PF.
Patrick Pélissier’s most clearly documented ministerial association is with the Fils-Aimé administration.
Their political backgrounds demonstrate continuity between different generations of Haitian public officials.
They also illustrate how transitional governments can bring together individuals with different historical affiliations.
But the fact that these officials signed the same agreement does not prove that they belonged to a common political organization before 2024.
Nor does it prove that former presidents or political-party leaders directed the Evergreen negotiations.
The real political question
Who selected the four ministers to negotiate and approve the Evergreen agreement, and what role did the prime minister and other government authorities play in authorizing its terms?
The answer requires the actual government authorization, negotiation records and signed contract.
PART VIII — THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
8. HOW MUCH COULD EVERGREEN RECEIVE?
The Evergreen agreement has been publicly described as a contract involving approximately US$542.6 million.
However, the reported compensation provisions require careful examination because the headline figure may not represent the maximum amount payable over ten years.
According to FJKL’s analysis, the agreement includes several financial mechanisms.
An initial payment
The government reportedly agreed to pay US$13.6 million in initial mobilization and implementation expenses.
These funds would support the beginning of the project and acquisition of equipment.
Import-related compensation
FJKL describes a fee linked to the value of imports recorded by Haitian Customs.
Reporting on the agreement identifies a rate of 3%.
The precise calculation period and conditions must be verified against the signed contract because published descriptions are not entirely consistent.
Performance-related compensation
FJKL reports that the consortium would receive compensation calculated on customs revenue above a specified annual threshold.
The reported rates are:
20% during the first three years.
15% during the remaining seven years.
The threshold identified by FJKL is approximately US$458 million in annual customs revenue.
Why the threshold matters
FJKL argues that Haiti’s customs collections had already exceeded that threshold before the agreement.
If correct, the arrangement could allow the contractor to receive substantial compensation even without generating major additional improvements.
This is one of the strongest financial criticisms of the agreement.
The central question is whether the contractor’s compensation is tied to genuinely new revenue attributable to its performance—or to revenue the Haitian state was already collecting.
Could payments exceed $1 billion?
FJKL estimates that the compensation structure could generate more than US$1 billion for the contractor over the contract’s duration.
That is the organization’s estimate, not a verified amount already paid or a final audited projection.
A definitive calculation requires the authenticated contract, its payment formulas and reliable customs-revenue forecasts.
Nevertheless, the reported structure warrants independent financial analysis.
Haiti must establish whether it is paying for measurable improvements in customs performance or committing future public revenue to a contractor regardless of the actual benefits delivered.
PART IX — WAS THE CONTRACT PROPERLY REVIEWED?
9. PROCUREMENT, GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION AND THE COURT OF AUDITORS
The Evergreen agreement raises important questions about Haitian public-procurement procedures.
FJKL criticized the terms of the contract and questioned whether the arrangement adequately protects the state’s interests.
Other reporting indicates that the agreement was submitted to the Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif (CSCCA).
A February 26, 2026, report stated that the CSCCA had approved a contract valued at approximately US$542.6 million.
That reported approval is important.
It means the investigation should not simply assume the contract bypassed every form of institutional review.
Instead, the public needs the CSCCA’s actual decision and any accompanying reservations.
The central questions are:
Was there competitive bidding?
If not, what legal exception justified the selection procedure?
What financial and technical evaluations were conducted?
Did the CSCCA identify risks?
Were the contract’s financial obligations fully disclosed?
Did the government evaluate the consortium’s ownership and financial capacity?
And what safeguards protect the state if the contractor fails to deliver?
A contract can receive institutional approval and still deserve rigorous public examination of its financial terms and policy consequences.
PART X — THE ERIK PRINCE QUESTION
10. IS EVERGREEN PART OF A LARGER FOREIGN SECURITY NETWORK?
The Evergreen agreement cannot be examined without considering Haiti’s broader reliance on foreign security contractors.
Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, has been associated with private security operations in Haiti.
Separate reporting has discussed contracts involving companies connected to his business activities.
Some accounts have suggested links between Evergreen and Prince-associated business networks.
However, the evidence reviewed does not conclusively establish Evergreen’s ultimate ownership or the precise corporate relationship, if any, between Evergreen and Prince.
This distinction is essential.
A reported commercial association is not the same as ownership.
And separate security contracts should not be merged without documentary evidence.
What needs to be established?
Investigators should obtain Evergreen’s shareholder records, identify its beneficial owners, review any subcontracting arrangements and examine whether companies involved in other Haitian security contracts share owners, directors or financial beneficiaries.
Until those records are available, the relationship remains an investigative question.
PART XI — THE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION
11. WHY IS HAITI STILL RELYING ON FOREIGN-DESIGNED SECURITY SYSTEMS?
The Evergreen agreement forms part of a broader debate about Haiti’s dependence on foreign assistance and foreign contractors.
For decades, international organizations have participated in Haiti’s electoral administration, civil identification, police development and security cooperation.
The Organization of American States helped support the development of Haiti’s national identification system.
The United Nations has participated in successive political and security missions.
Canada, the United States and other partners have financed equipment, training and institutional programs.
In November 2026, the OAS announced another maritime security initiative.
UNODC also announced that a mobile cargo scanner had become operational at Cap-Haïtien International Airport.
These developments involve different organizations and funding arrangements.
There is no verified evidence establishing that the UNODC scanner is part of the Evergreen contract.
But together they illustrate the growing importance of externally financed technology and services in Haiti’s border-security system.
The sovereignty question
Haiti needs functioning customs controls, modern inspection equipment and effective maritime surveillance.
International cooperation can help provide those capabilities.
But the country must determine who exercises operational authority, who controls the technology, who owns the information and who receives the financial benefits.
The long-term objective should be to build Haitian institutions capable of operating these systems independently.
PART XII — THE HISTORICAL PARALLEL WITH HAITI’S ELECTIONS
12. FROM THE 2010–2011 ELECTORAL DISPUTE TO THE 2026 CUSTOMS CONTRACT
Haiti’s experience with international electoral assistance provides an important historical comparison.
During the disputed 2010–2011 presidential election, an OAS expert mission recommended changes to the first-round results that would place Michel Martelly ahead of Jude Célestin.
The recommendation influenced the process that led to Martelly’s participation in the runoff against Mirlande Manigat.
The United States also exerted diplomatic pressure during the controversy.
Hillary Clinton visited Haiti in January 2011 while serving as U.S. secretary of state.
These events demonstrate that international participation in Haitian institutions can have significant political consequences.
They do not establish that foreign governments directly controlled every electoral decision.
But they illustrate the importance of protecting institutional independence.
The Evergreen agreement raises a comparable governance question in a different sector.
When an essential national function depends on external financing, technology or private contractors, how does Haiti preserve effective control over the decisions that matter?
In elections, that question concerns electoral administration and political legitimacy.
In customs and border security, it concerns government revenue, surveillance, enforcement and national infrastructure.
The sectors are different.
The underlying challenge is institutional independence.
PART XIII — THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FILS-AIMÉ GOVERNMENT
13. WHO AUTHORIZED THE AGREEMENT?
Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé headed the government when the Evergreen agreement was signed.
FJKL identifies four ministers as the government’s signatories.
Their signatures establish an important connection to the agreement, but several levels of responsibility must be distinguished.
Who initiated the project?
Who selected the consortium?
Who negotiated the payment formulas?
Who approved the legal provisions?
Who authorized the final agreement?
Who was responsible for implementation?
And who reviewed the potential long-term impact on customs revenue?
The prime minister’s political responsibility as head of government does not necessarily mean he personally negotiated or signed every contractual provision.
Likewise, the participation of four ministers does not establish that each negotiated every clause.
The public record should clarify their individual roles.
PART XIV — WHAT ABOUT CORRUPTION?
14. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CONTROVERSIAL CONTRACT AND PROVEN MISCONDUCT
FJKL’s report raises serious concerns about the Evergreen agreement.
Those concerns include its financial structure, the delegation of sovereign functions and the possibility that the contractor could receive substantial compensation under terms unfavorable to the state.
The organization called for further investigation.
That is not equivalent to a judicial finding that the ministers committed corruption.
No verified evidence reviewed for this article establishes that Alfred Fils Métellus, Patrick Pélissier, Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé or Jean-Michel Moïse personally received bribes or illicit commissions from Evergreen.
Nor has this investigation established that any of them secretly owns shares in the consortium.
The distinction must be maintained.
At the same time, the absence of a proven criminal offense does not eliminate the need to examine government decision-making.
Public officials can be questioned about financial prudence, transparency, procurement compliance and administrative responsibility without being presumed guilty of crimes.
The strongest investigation will follow the contracts, the authorization records and the money—not rely on political associations alone.
PART XV — FIFTEEN QUESTIONS THE HAITIAN PUBLIC DESERVES ANSWERED
1. Who are the ultimate beneficial owners of Evergreen Trading System Limited?
2. What is Vincent Roy Gordon’s complete professional and corporate background?
3. Does Evergreen have any documented ownership or contractual relationship with Erik Prince-associated companies?
4. Who recommended Evergreen to the Haitian government?
5. Was the consortium selected through competitive procurement?
6. What role did Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé personally play in approving the agreement?
7. Did Alfred Fils Métellus authorize an independent financial evaluation of the contract?
8. What legal opinion did Patrick Pélissier’s ministry provide concerning the delegation of security functions?
9. What information-access and immigration-system safeguards did Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé’s ministry require?
10. Did Jean-Michel Moïse’s Defense Ministry independently evaluate the proposed equipment and suppliers?
11. What exactly did the CSCCA approve, and did it issue any reservations?
12. How much could Evergreen receive over ten years under different customs-revenue scenarios?
13. What equipment and services have actually been delivered since the agreement was signed?
14. What contractual protections allow Haiti to terminate or renegotiate the arrangement if the contractor fails to perform?
15. Why did the government select a long-term revenue-sharing arrangement instead of a Haitian-led customs modernization program financed through conventional procurement and technical assistance?
CONCLUSION — FOUR MINISTERS, ONE CONTRACT, AND A QUESTION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The Evergreen agreement brings together several important elements of Haiti’s contemporary political history.
Alfred Fils Métellus previously served in the Martelly–Lamothe administration.
Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé held senior positions under René Préval.
Jean-Michel Moïse served in Parliament under the Federalist Party before becoming defense minister.
Patrick Pélissier entered the Fils-Aimé cabinet as justice minister.
Their political backgrounds are different.
But in February 2026, they represented the same government in an agreement involving some of Haiti’s most sensitive public functions.
The foreign consortium was represented by Vincent Roy Gordon.
Its ultimate beneficial ownership remains insufficiently established in the public information reviewed.
The agreement reportedly involves a ten-year commitment, substantial equipment and infrastructure expenditures, and compensation tied to customs activity.
FJKL argues that its financial provisions could impose major long-term costs on the Haitian state.
These concerns deserve an independent investigation.
But the evidence does not establish that the four ministers formed a corruption conspiracy or that their previous political affiliations determined the contractor’s selection.
The most important unanswered questions concern the procurement process, financial justification, beneficial ownership, implementation and distribution of authority.
Haiti needs modern customs facilities.
Haiti needs effective border security.
Haiti needs technology capable of detecting illegal firearms, contraband and other security threats.
But modernization must also strengthen the institutions that belong to the Haitian people.
The central issue is not simply whether a foreign company can provide equipment or technical services.
It is whether the Haitian government has protected the country’s financial interests and preserved effective authority over customs enforcement, immigration information and national security operations.
After decades of international assistance and repeated promises of institutional reform, Haiti should be building the capacity to manage its own borders—not creating arrangements that risk extending dependence for another generation.
The government should publish the complete Evergreen agreement, its financial annexes, procurement documentation, beneficial ownership declarations and implementation reports.
The CSCCA should make its findings accessible.
The appropriate anti-corruption and oversight institutions should examine any credible evidence of irregularities.
And the four ministers should publicly explain their respective roles.
HAITI’S CUSTOMS REVENUE BELONGS TO THE HAITIAN STATE.
HAITI’S BORDERS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF HAITIAN INSTITUTIONS.
HAITI’S GOVERNMENT MUST ANSWER TO THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.
The question is not whether Haiti needs modernization. The question is who designed the agreement, who controls its implementation, who receives the money and whether the Haitian public will receive the benefits promised.
HAITI POLITIC — SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Editorial note: This investigation distinguishes documented government appointments, reported contractual provisions, political associations and allegations requiring further verification. No finding of personal criminal wrongdoing is made against the individuals named.


