From the Removal of Garry Conille to the Rise of Bukele’s Military Operations: What Has Haiti’s Prime Minister Accomplished, What Controversies Surround His Government, and Where Is the Country Heading?
HAITI POLITIC | SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
November 10, 2026 | Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Two years after Alix Didier Fils-Aimé was selected to lead Haiti’s transitional government, the country continues to confront armed violence, economic contraction, mass displacement, and uncertainty over elections. His administration has pursued new security operations, international partnerships, and political agreements. But the anniversary also raises questions about democratic legitimacy, public spending, foreign military involvement, and the government’s ability to restore functioning Haitian institutions.
1. NOVEMBER 10, 2024: HOW FILS-AIMÉ CAME TO POWER
On November 10, 2024, Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council decided to remove Prime Minister Garry Conille and replace him with businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
The decision followed months of disagreements between Conille and members of the council over executive authority, government appointments, and the management of Haiti’s political transition.
Conille had served approximately six months.
The replacement immediately generated controversy because the Transitional Presidential Council itself was facing allegations of corruption.
Three council members had been accused of participating in a bribery scheme involving an alleged demand for $750,000. The allegations concerned council members, not a proven offense by Fils-Aimé.
Some Haitian legal observers also questioned whether the council had exercised its authority properly when removing Conille.
The United States acknowledged the appointment and expressed its willingness to work with the new prime minister while emphasizing the importance of security, governance, elections, and accountability.
The circumstances of Fils-Aimé’s appointment therefore became part of a larger debate: who should exercise executive power during a transition when Haiti has no elected president or functioning elected national legislature?
Sources: Associated Press, November 2024; U.S. Department of State, November 12, 2024.
2. FROM BUSINESS LEADER TO HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
Before entering the prime minister’s office, Fils-Aimé had developed a career in Haiti’s business community.
He previously served as president of Haiti’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry and was involved in the telecommunications sector.
He also pursued elected office, unsuccessfully running for the Senate in 2015.
His business background was relevant to the expectations surrounding his appointment.
Supporters of business-oriented leadership often argue that experience managing enterprises can help a government address investment, employment, infrastructure, and economic recovery.
But private-sector experience does not automatically resolve the challenges of governing a country confronting widespread insecurity, weak institutions, and political fragmentation.
The transition required Fils-Aimé to manage several responsibilities simultaneously: maintaining public administration, coordinating security institutions, negotiating with political groups, attracting international assistance, and preparing national elections.
Those responsibilities became more concentrated in February 2026.
3. FEBRUARY 7, 2026: THE PRIME MINISTER BECOMES THE CENTER OF EXECUTIVE POWER
The Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate ended on February 7, 2026.
Its departure represented a significant change in Haiti’s transitional arrangements.
Executive authority passed to the Council of Ministers under Fils-Aimé’s leadership.
The transfer followed another political confrontation.
In January 2026, several council members attempted to remove Fils-Aimé before their mandate expired.
The United States opposed the attempted dismissal and publicly supported his continued leadership.
Washington also announced punitive measures against some Haitian political figures during the dispute.
The episode exposed two competing concerns.
On one side, supporters of continuity argued that removing another prime minister immediately before the council’s expiration could deepen political instability.
On the other, critics questioned whether strong international backing was becoming a substitute for a broadly accepted domestic political settlement.
Fils-Aimé’s continued leadership reflected a combination of transitional political arrangements, domestic negotiations, and international diplomatic support.
But that support did not eliminate the central legitimacy problem: Haiti still lacked a nationally elected executive.
Sources: Reuters, February 7, 2026; CSIS, February 2026; United Nations reporting.
PART I — THE ADMINISTRATION’S DOCUMENTED ACTIONS
4. SECURITY: NEW OPERATIONS AND LIMITED TERRITORIAL GAINS
Security has remained the defining challenge of Fils-Aimé’s administration.
His government inherited a crisis involving heavily armed groups, territorial fragmentation, attacks on police, disruption of transportation routes, and widespread displacement.
During his tenure, Haitian authorities intensified security operations.
A United Nations Panel of Experts report published in October 2026 found that operations conducted since December 2025 had helped halt gang expansion in some parts of Port-au-Prince and clear certain areas, including locations in downtown Port-au-Prince and Delmas.
These are documented operational developments.
However, clearing an area during an operation does not necessarily mean that the state has established permanent control.
Long-term security requires sustained police presence, judicial access, functioning public services, and the ability of displaced residents to return safely.
The same UN report noted that implementation of broader security commitments remained slow.
The government’s security record therefore includes both documented tactical advances and substantial unresolved challenges.
The appropriate questions are measurable:
How many territories have remained under government control after security operations?
How many armed-group leaders have been arrested and prosecuted?
How many illegal weapons have been recovered?
How many displaced families have returned home?
And how many police stations, courts, schools, and public institutions are operating again?
Without these measurements, military announcements cannot provide a complete picture of security outcomes.
Source: UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, S/2026/714.
5. THE ANTI-GANG TASK FORCE AND PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
One of the most controversial security developments during Fils-Aimé’s tenure has been the government’s reliance on specialized anti-gang operations involving private security contractors.
Reuters reported in July 2026 that Erik Prince’s company, Vectus Global, had been operating in Haiti since March 2025.
The company was associated with drone operations conducted through a Haitian government task force targeting armed groups.
The arrangement raised questions about the use of private military expertise in domestic security operations.
The government and its supporters can argue that specialized equipment and technical capabilities are necessary when police confront heavily armed organizations.
Critics have raised concerns about civilian casualties, transparency, contractor accountability, and the legal rules governing drone operations.
The essential issue is not simply whether specialized technology can be useful. It is whether the government has established adequate oversight of its use.
The public deserves to know the contract’s financial terms, the responsibilities assigned to contractors, the rules governing the use of force, and the mechanisms available to investigate civilian harm.
The existence of a private security contract does not itself establish corruption or illegality.
But the absence of accessible information about major public-security expenditures creates legitimate accountability questions.
Source: Reuters, July 21, 2026.
6. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE GSF
Fils-Aimé’s administration has continued cooperating with international security partners.
The government has supported the transition toward the Gang Suppression Force, intended to assist Haitian authorities in confronting armed groups.
International support can provide equipment, logistics, intelligence, training, and personnel that Haiti’s security institutions may lack.
However, foreign assistance also creates important questions about command structures and national authority.
Who determines operational priorities?
Who authorizes the use of force?
Who investigates allegations of misconduct?
And how will the Haitian National Police eventually assume full responsibility for the areas secured with foreign assistance?
The government’s achievement cannot be measured solely by the number of international personnel deployed. It must also be measured by improvements in Haiti’s own security capacity.
7. THE NATIONAL PACT FOR STABILITY AND ELECTIONS
Following the end of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate, Fils-Aimé’s government supported a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections.
The agreement was adopted in February 2026 with participation from political, economic, and civil society actors.
Its stated purpose was to provide a political framework for the transition, strengthen stability, and advance the electoral process.
The pact represented an effort to organize political cooperation after the council’s expiration.
But participation was not universal, and questions remained about implementation.
The UN Panel of Experts reported that, as of mid-July 2026, implementation of important provisions, particularly those concerning security, had been slow.
The pact also raised questions about the relationship between the new political arrangements and previously announced election deadlines.
Signing a political agreement is a documented action. Whether that agreement produces credible elections and stronger institutions is a separate question.
Sources: UN Panel of Experts, October 2026; IMF, May 2026.
8. PUBLIC FINANCES AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
Fils-Aimé’s administration has continued working with international financial institutions during a period of severe economic stress.
In May 2026, the International Monetary Fund announced completion of the third review of Haiti’s Staff-Monitored Program and extended the arrangement.
The IMF reported that certain fiscal and social-spending targets had remained on track as of December 2025.
It also identified continuing weaknesses in revenue collection, budget execution, public investment management, and institutional capacity.
These developments matter because they demonstrate that some public-finance monitoring and administrative processes continued despite the security crisis.
However, compliance with selected fiscal targets does not mean that economic conditions have improved for most Haitian households.
Haiti’s real GDP contracted by 2.7% in fiscal year 2025.
Inflation remained high, while insecurity continued to disrupt agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, and commercial activity.
The IMF also noted that the government’s April 2026 fuel-price increase would reduce the fiscal burden associated with higher international petroleum prices.
For households and businesses, however, higher fuel costs can increase transportation and living expenses.
The economic record must therefore distinguish fiscal administration from economic recovery.
Source: IMF Country Report No. 26/107 and IMF statement, May 2026.
PART II — THE MAJOR CONTROVERSIES
9. TWO YEARS IN OFFICE, BUT NO RESTORED ELECTED GOVERNMENT
Perhaps the most consequential unresolved issue is Haiti’s political transition.
Fils-Aimé entered office in November 2024 as a transitional prime minister.
Two years later, Haiti still has not completed the process of restoring a nationally elected government.
The Provisional Electoral Council initially published a calendar in December 2025 scheduling presidential and legislative elections for August 30, 2026, with subsequent voting in December.
The council warned that implementation depended on acceptable security conditions and adequate financing.
Later electoral decrees and administrative changes disrupted the original timetable.
In October 2026, the CEP extended candidate registration and postponed the campaign period pending an updated calendar.
A November 2026 policy briefing reported a revised schedule extending the electoral process into 2027. That timetable should be checked against the CEP’s latest official publication before being treated as definitive.
The central controversy is not merely that elections have been delayed. It is that Haiti continues to rely on transitional arrangements without a completed return to electoral legitimacy.
Security constraints are substantial and documented.
But prolonged transition also creates questions about accountability, institutional authority, and the incentives of political actors who remain in office.
Sources: CEP official calendar, December 2025; CEP October 2026 communication; November 2026 policy briefing.
10. WASHINGTON’S SUPPORT: DIPLOMATIC STABILITY OR EXCESSIVE FOREIGN INFLUENCE?
Fils-Aimé’s relationship with the United States has become an important feature of his political leadership.
Washington supported his continuation in office during the January–February 2026 confrontation with members of the Transitional Presidential Council.
American officials argued that Haiti needed continuity to confront armed groups and advance political stabilization.
That position has a practical rationale: repeated changes in government can interrupt security coordination and administrative planning.
Nevertheless, strong U.S. support for a Haitian transitional leader raises legitimate questions about political independence and domestic legitimacy.
How much influence should Washington exercise over the composition and survival of Haiti’s executive government?
What role should Haitian political parties, civil society organizations, professional associations, and constitutional institutions play in determining transitional leadership?
And how can international assistance support Haitian governance without becoming a substitute for domestic political accountability?
The existence of U.S. support is documented.
Claims that Fils-Aimé takes orders from Washington or that American officials control every government decision would require additional evidence.
Sources: Reuters, February 2026; CSIS analysis.
11. THE BUKELE QUESTION: WHO AUTHORIZED SALVADORAN MILITARY OPERATIONS?
One of the newest controversies confronting Fils-Aimé involves President Nayib Bukele’s military deployment in Haiti.
In November 2026, the Associated Press reported that at least 2,500 Salvadoran personnel were operating in Haiti.
The deployment followed an October incident involving four missing Salvadoran aviation technicians.
Their fate remains disputed.
Salvadoran forces have subsequently participated in operations against armed groups, including an operation targeting a property linked to Wilson Joseph, known as Lanmò San Jou, leader of 400 Mawozo.
The operation destroyed the property but did not result in Joseph’s capture.
According to the Associated Press, Salvadoran representatives said the deployment was covered by an agreement between Haiti and El Salvador.
However, the publicly available details of that agreement remained unclear.
The legal distinction matters.
Participation in a multinational mission does not automatically establish the legal basis for every separate military operation.
A bilateral agreement may provide additional authority, but its actual terms, scope, command arrangements, and applicable legal safeguards must be examined.
Fils-Aimé has publicly welcomed Salvadoran assistance.
That creates an obligation for his government to explain the legal and operational framework.
Five questions require answers:
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What agreement authorizes Salvadoran military operations in Haiti?
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Who exercises operational command over Salvadoran personnel?
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What rules govern targeting, civilian protection, and investigations?
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Who pays for the deployment and associated equipment?
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What conditions will determine the mission’s completion and withdrawal?
The government can argue that foreign assistance is necessary to address an extraordinary security emergency.
But that argument does not eliminate the need for transparency and legal oversight.
The Associated Press also reported that Fils-Aimé was expected to visit El Salvador to discuss the deployment’s future.
Source: Associated Press, November 10, 2026.
12. SECURITY CONTRACTS AND PUBLIC SPENDING: THE NEED FOR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Public debate has increasingly focused on the financial cost of Haiti’s security operations.
Questions concern the procurement of equipment, private security services, operational logistics, and international military assistance.
These questions are legitimate because major security expenditures may involve public funds, international financing, and confidential contracts.
However, a responsible investigation must distinguish between documented contracts, reported financial figures, and unverified allegations.
For each significant security agreement, Haiti Politic would seek:
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The signed contract and any amendments.
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The identity and beneficial ownership of the contracting companies.
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The amount authorized, obligated, and actually paid.
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The procurement procedure and legal justification.
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The services delivered and independently verified results.
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Any audit findings, conflicts of interest, or documented irregularities.
A contract’s existence is not proof of wrongdoing. Conversely, invoking national security should not automatically exempt public expenditures from appropriate oversight.
13. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY PURCHASES AND CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST QUESTIONS
Recent Haitian media reporting has raised allegations concerning government real-estate acquisitions and other public expenditures.
Among the transactions questioned are reported purchases involving Gala Tower and a Best Western hotel property.
The same reporting raises questions about a transaction involving broadcast rights for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
Some published allegations include claims of differences between estimated asset values and reported government purchase prices, as well as possible personal or business connections involving officials.
These are allegations requiring independent verification, not established findings of corruption by Fils-Aimé.
The reporting reviewed for this article did not provide sufficient primary documentation to establish the final transaction prices, independent valuations, beneficial ownership, procurement compliance, or whether a legally actionable conflict of interest occurred.
An investigation should obtain the executed purchase agreements, payment records, appraisals, corporate ownership documents, and relevant public procurement approvals.
The prime minister and any companies or individuals named in such reporting should have an opportunity to respond.
Until those records are verified, it would be inappropriate to conclude that Fils-Aimé personally benefited from any transaction.
Source: Radar News, November 2026.
PART III — THE CONDITIONS FACING HAITIAN FAMILIES
14. DISPLACEMENT, FOOD INSECURITY, AND THE HUMAN COST OF INSTABILITY
A government anniversary must be examined alongside the conditions experienced by the population.
According to the World Bank, approximately 1.5 million people had been displaced within Haiti by September 2026.
The World Bank also reported that approximately 5.83 million people experienced high levels of acute food insecurity between March and June 2026.
The Food and Agriculture Organization documented how armed violence, roadblocks, agricultural disruption, and transportation costs continued to affect food supplies.
These figures describe a humanitarian crisis that began before Fils-Aimé’s appointment and has continued during his administration.
They should not be attributed exclusively to decisions made by one prime minister.
Nevertheless, they provide essential context for evaluating government policy.
For displaced families, the meaningful indicators of progress are not the number of security announcements or diplomatic meetings. They are whether people can return home, obtain food, send children to school, and move safely through their communities.
Sources: World Bank Haiti overview; FAO Haiti country brief.
15. THE ECONOMY: WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR ORDINARY HAITIANS?
Haiti’s economic challenges extend well beyond government budgets.
Businesses face transportation interruptions, insecurity, high operating costs, and uncertainty about access to markets.
Farmers struggle to move agricultural products.
Manufacturers confront supply-chain problems.
Families experience the combined effects of inflation, unemployment, displacement, and reduced access to services.
The IMF reported that Haiti’s economy contracted for a seventh consecutive year in fiscal year 2025.
Although inflation eased from earlier peaks during 2026, prices remained elevated.
The distinction is important: lower inflation means prices are increasing more slowly; it does not necessarily mean essential goods have become affordable again.
The administration’s economic initiatives should therefore be evaluated using measurable outcomes, including employment, household purchasing power, agricultural production, business activity, tax collection, and access to essential services.
Macroeconomic stabilization and improvements in everyday living conditions are related, but they are not the same thing.
Source: IMF, May 2026.
PART IV — THE QUESTIONS FILS-AIMÉ MUST ANSWER
16. TEN QUESTIONS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS SECOND ANNIVERSARY
1. Security: Which territories have been permanently recovered from armed groups since November 2024, and what independent evidence demonstrates sustained state control?
2. Gang financing: What investigations have identified the financiers, arms suppliers, and political protectors of armed groups, and how many cases have resulted in prosecutions?
3. Foreign military deployments: Will the government publish the agreements governing Salvadoran troops and other international security forces operating in Haiti?
4. Private contractors: What are the financial terms, operational responsibilities, and accountability provisions of the government’s private security arrangements?
5. Elections: What specific measures will the government take to support credible elections, and how will it address further changes to the electoral timetable?
6. Political legitimacy: What mechanism will ensure that transitional executive authority remains accountable to Haitian institutions and the public?
7. Public spending: Will the government release detailed records of major security contracts, real-estate acquisitions, and other disputed public expenditures?
8. Economic recovery: What measurable changes in employment, agricultural production, investment, and household purchasing power can the government document?
9. Displaced families: How many displaced households have returned safely to their communities, and what services have been restored in those areas?
10. Institutional independence: What is the government’s long-term strategy for enabling Haitian police, courts, and public institutions to maintain security without indefinite foreign military assistance?
CONCLUSION — TWO YEARS IN OFFICE, WITH THE TRANSITION STILL UNFINISHED
November 10, 2026, marks two years since Alix Didier Fils-Aimé was selected to replace Garry Conille as Haiti’s prime minister.
His administration has pursued security operations, international partnerships, fiscal coordination, and political agreements intended to move the country toward stability and elections.
There have been documented tactical security advances in certain areas, continued engagement with international financial institutions, and efforts to organize a political framework following the Transitional Presidential Council’s departure.
At the same time, major challenges remain.
Haiti continues to face widespread displacement, food insecurity, economic contraction, uncertainty over elections, and questions about the oversight of foreign military operations and public expenditures.
The prime minister’s second anniversary is therefore an opportunity to examine the evidence behind government announcements.
Which policies have produced measurable improvements? Which initiatives remain incomplete? Which expenditures have been independently audited? And what institutional arrangements will survive beyond the current transitional government?
These questions apply not only to Fils-Aimé but also to the Transitional Presidential Council, earlier administrations, international partners, security contractors, and other actors who have exercised influence over Haiti’s political and security institutions.
Ultimately, the durability of any progress will depend on whether Haiti can restore elected government, functioning courts, effective policing, accountable public finances, and reliable public services.
Two years after Fils-Aimé’s appointment, the central question is not simply what the prime minister has announced. It is what can be documented, independently verified, and sustained by Haitian institutions.
HAITI POLITIC
Independent Analysis | Investigative Reporting | Public Policy
November 10, 2026


