A political and diplomatic assessment of six months in office

On September 9, 2026, Haiti’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship (MAEC) issued a press release touting Minister Raina Forbin’s participation in the Doha Programme of Action mid-term review for Least Developed Countries in Addis Ababa. The release is typical of the genre: economic recovery, investment, job creation, “paradigm shift” language on aid versus investment, and a closing appeal for “strengthened international solidarity.” It says little about what Haitian diplomacy has actually delivered since Forbin took office. That gap is worth examining directly.

Who is Raina Forbin?

Forbin arrives at the MAEC from the private sector, not from career diplomacy. She built her public profile in Haiti’s tourism industry and through private-sector advocacy on the country’s economic situation. She studied in Haiti and at the Université du Québec à Montréal, with professional experience spanning the Dominican Republic, Canada, and the United States.

Her entry into government came in 2025, when she was named Director of Cabinet for Laurent Saint-Cyr, then chairman of the now-dissolved Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) — a post that gave her her first sustained exposure to diplomatic missions and international forums. On March 3–4, 2026, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé installed her as head of the MAEC, succeeding Jean Harvel Victor Jean-Baptiste, in a ceremony that emphasized continuity and “proactive diplomacy.”

She is, in short, a technocrat with a business background rather than a career diplomat — a profile that mirrors the broader composition of the Fils-Aimé government, staffed largely with private-sector figures brought in under the banner of competence and impartiality.

What has she accomplished?

Six months in, Forbin’s record shows real, if modest, activity:

  • Reopened air links with the Dominican Republic. After more than two years of suspended flights following the DR’s unilateral border closure in March 2024, Forbin and her Dominican counterpart announced in April 2026 the resumption of air travel between Cap-Haïtien and Dominican airports, effective May 1, 2026.
  • Sustained bilateral engagement with Santo Domingo. She has held repeated working sessions with Dominican foreign ministers — first Roberto Álvarez, then Víctor “Ito” Bisonó — on border security, trade formalization, migration management, and judicial cooperation, most recently at Dajabón on September 3, 2026, just before the Addis Ababa trip.
  • Institutional reform push at the MAEC. In March 2026 she presented a diplomatic roadmap, and in July she convened Haiti’s 57 diplomatic and consular mission chiefs worldwide to review implementation and align priorities — an unusually systematic exercise for a ministry long criticized for disorganization.
  • Diaspora-facing initiatives. In August 2026 she unveiled five strategic pillars for her tenure along with digital platforms aimed at Haitians abroad, including a plan for dozens of dedicated websites to help U.S.-based Haitians navigate their changing immigration status.
  • Multilateral visibility. She has represented Haiti at CARICOM’s 50th Heads of Government meeting, engaged with the OAS, and now the Doha Programme of Action review — part of a consistent pattern of showing up at the forums that matter for a country trying to rebuild international credibility.

Where the record falls short

The accomplishments above describe activity, not outcomes — and that distinction is precisely where Forbin’s critics have concentrated their fire. An August 2026 assessment in Rezo Nòdwès put it bluntly: since taking office, Forbin has projected the image of a chancellery in motion — traveling, meeting, appearing at forums — but the balance sheet remains lopsided, heavy on presence and activity, light on measurable strategic results. That same piece was careful to note the limits of what any foreign minister controls: she doesn’t command the police, the international security mission, or U.S. migration policy. But it argued a foreign minister should be judged precisely on the ability to extract what the country cannot secure on its own — and by that standard, the results remain incomplete.

Two concrete episodes illustrate the criticism:

The end of TPS. When the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for the termination of Temporary Protected Status for roughly 330,000–350,000 Haitians on June 25, 2026, with the status formally expiring July 27, the Haitian government’s public response was notably muted. Reporting at the time noted the absence of any announced contingency plan for a potential mass return of migrants — a silence that drew direct criticism of the ministry given the scale of the remittance economy at stake and the acute security conditions migrants would be returning to.

Persistence of the Dominican migrant crisis. Despite the regular ministerial meetings with Santo Domingo, human rights organizations — including the GARR (Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés) — documented waves of raids and deportations of Haitian workers across Dominican provinces through 2026, including pregnant women and children, often bypassing the 1999 bilateral repatriation protocol. An August 5 commentary asked pointedly where Haitian diplomacy stood as complaints mounted both in the Dominican Republic and among Haitian migrants facing new enforcement actions in the U.S. Midwest — arguing that sovereignty on the receiving end does not preclude a more assertive protective posture from Port-au-Prince.

Reading the September 9 release against that record

Seen against this backdrop, the Addis Ababa press release reads as consistent with the pattern critics have already identified: another multilateral appearance, another set of aspirational lines about shifting “from aid to investment,” another call for international solidarity — with no reference to the two issues most directly affecting ordinary Haitians and the diaspora right now, TPS’s aftermath and the treatment of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. A ministry genuinely reoriented toward results would have an obvious opportunity, in a release about LDC development financing, to tie global appeals directly to the return and reintegration of tens of thousands of Haitians facing displacement — and it does not.

The fair conclusion

Forbin inherited a ministry with real structural constraints: no elected government to speak for, minimal leverage over Washington or Santo Domingo, and a security crisis that overshadows every diplomatic conversation Haiti tries to have. Her reform push, the resumption of DR flights, and her sustained bilateral engagement are genuine, verifiable achievements that should not be dismissed. But six months on, the gap between visible activity and tangible protection for Haitians — at home and abroad — is exactly what her critics have flagged, and this latest press release does little to close it.