From divisions inside PHTK to the collapse of presidential security, a former Colombian commander’s testimony and a journalist’s account of mysterious overnight telephone calls raise questions about the political and security networks surrounding Haiti’s murdered president.

HAITI POLITIC | SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
November 8, 2026

An examination of political relationships, media connections, courtroom testimony, and unresolved questions surrounding the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse.


THE NIGHT HAITI’S PRESIDENT WAS LEFT WITHOUT PROTECTION

In the early morning hours of July 7, 2021, armed men entered the private residence of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in Pèlerin, above Port-au-Prince.

The president was shot and killed. His wife, Martine Moïse, was seriously wounded.

But one of the most consequential questions surrounding the assassination remains unresolved:

How could an armed operation reach the president’s bedroom without his security detail stopping the attackers?

Nearly five years later, testimony in Miami federal court has brought that question back into focus.

Former Colombian military personnel have described an operation involving intelligence about the presidential residence, logistical coordination, and alleged arrangements with Haitian security officers.

Former Haitian government official Joseph Félix Badio has emerged as a central figure in the prosecution’s account of the conspiracy.

Meanwhile, the political history surrounding Moïse’s presidency raises a separate question: How much control did the president exercise over a security establishment that included personnel whose careers began under his predecessor, Michel Martelly?

And there is another, less-examined story.

Haitian historian and political commentator Michel Soukar says that during the night of the assassination, someone he described as a director at Radio Signal FM repeatedly attempted to telephone him.

When Soukar finally returned the call around 5 a.m., the individual informed him that Jovenel Moïse had been killed and offered to send photographs.

The account opens a new investigative avenue into the early circulation of information about the assassination.

To understand why these questions matter, it is necessary to examine the political relationships that developed long before July 7, 2021.


PART I — MARTELLY, PHTK AND THE PRESIDENT WHO GREW DISTANT FROM HIS OWN PARTY

1. The political alliance that brought Jovenel Moïse to power

Michel Martelly became Haiti’s president in 2011.

His political movement, the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK), subsequently became the vehicle through which businessman Jovenel Moïse entered presidential politics.

Martelly supported Moïse’s candidacy, and Moïse eventually assumed the presidency on February 7, 2017.

At first glance, this appeared to represent political continuity.

The outgoing president had helped bring his preferred successor to power.

But political continuity did not necessarily mean that the two men would maintain identical interests, advisers, or alliances.

As Moïse’s presidency progressed, divisions emerged within the political environment associated with PHTK.

Some party figures became critical of the president. Moïse increasingly pursued his own political agenda, while other politicians associated with the Martelly era maintained separate networks of influence.

By 2021, disagreements surrounding the electoral process, constitutional referendum, and political transition had further complicated relations within the governing political establishment.

The important question is not simply whether PHTK was divided. It is whether those divisions affected the president’s relationships with the institutions and individuals responsible for his security.

Political disagreements alone do not establish involvement in an assassination. But they provide essential context for examining competing loyalties and the operation of presidential institutions.


PART II — WHO REALLY CONTROLLED JOVENEL MOÏSE’S PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY?

2. The Dimitri Hérard connection

One of the most important figures in the presidential security investigation is Dimitri Hérard.

Hérard served within the presidential security establishment during Michel Martelly’s administration.

He subsequently became head of the General Security Unit of the National Palace, known as the USGPN, under Jovenel Moïse.

That institutional continuity is significant.

The transition from one presidency to another did not necessarily produce a complete replacement of the security personnel responsible for protecting Haiti’s head of state.

Investigative reporting has described tensions and distrust involving Moïse and Hérard.

But the existence of those tensions raises a question that has never been satisfactorily answered in public:

If President Moïse distrusted individuals responsible for his security, why did they remain in sensitive positions?

Was the problem institutional bureaucracy?

Political influence?

Conflicting chains of command?

Or did the president believe he lacked the political leverage necessary to reorganize his security establishment?

These possibilities require evidence rather than assumptions.

3. The security failure on July 7

During her testimony in Miami federal court in September 2026, Martine Moïse described the attack on the presidential residence.

She recounted waking to gunfire, attempting to protect her children, and returning to her husband before the attackers entered their bedroom.

She also described the absence of the security officers she expected to protect the family.

According to CBS Miami’s September 29 courtroom report, Martine Moïse testified that none of the approximately 40 to 50 security officers assigned to the residence came to assist them.

That testimony raises fundamental operational questions.

Where were the guards?

Who was commanding them?

What instructions had they received?

Did officers abandon their posts voluntarily?

Were they ordered to withdraw?

Were some compromised by payments or other arrangements?

And what communications occurred between security commanders before and during the attack?

The answers may be central to understanding how the assassination became possible.

A failure of presidential protection is established by the outcome. The precise causes of that failure—and the individual responsibility of particular officers—must be established through evidence.


PART III — JOSEPH FÉLIX BADIO AND THE COLOMBIAN COMMANDOS

4. A former Colombian commander identifies Badio

The Miami federal proceedings have produced some of the most detailed public testimony concerning the operation.

Former Colombian army captain Germán Alejandro Rivera García, who pleaded guilty in connection with the assassination conspiracy, testified about Joseph Félix Badio’s alleged operational role.

Rivera identified Badio as a source of intelligence concerning the presidential residence.

According to courtroom reporting, Rivera testified that Badio became his operational superior in Haiti after the original plan to remove Moïse changed.

Rivera also described Badio as the individual responsible for giving authorization to proceed with the attack.

This testimony is especially significant because it concerns the operation’s command structure.

The Colombian participants were not merely acting in isolation, according to Rivera’s account.

They were receiving instructions from individuals involved in the broader conspiracy.

5. Was Badio physically present during the operation?

Rivera’s testimony went further.

He described a convoy of vehicles traveling toward the presidential residence during the night of July 6–7, 2021.

According to the courtroom account, Badio was in the lead vehicle with two Colombians, while Rivera followed in another vehicle.

Rivera testified that Badio was present near the presidential residence as the operation unfolded.

He also alleged that Badio requested the killing of Haitian police officers who had been confronted by the attacking group.

Rivera said he refused that request.

These are allegations made in sworn testimony by a cooperating participant in the conspiracy. They have not been independently adjudicated against Badio.

Nevertheless, they are materially different from an allegation that Badio merely provided political advice or intelligence before the assassination.

The testimony places Badio within the operational sequence on the night of the attack.

Badio has denied involvement in the assassination and is entitled to the presumption of innocence.

6. The allegation that presidential guards were paid

Another important issue emerging from the Miami proceedings concerns alleged payments to presidential security personnel.

Witness testimony and prosecution accounts have described arrangements intended to neutralize resistance from the president’s guards.

If security officers were paid to abandon their duties, investigators must determine exactly who received the money, who authorized the payments, and whether the transactions can be corroborated through financial records.

This issue cannot be resolved simply by identifying Badio as an alleged organizer.

It requires examining the receiving side of any alleged arrangement.

Who were the officers?

Which security units did they belong to?

Who supervised them?

Were payments delivered directly or through intermediaries?

And did the officers who allegedly received money participate in decisions that allowed the attackers to enter the residence?

The answers could reveal whether the security failure resulted from negligence, deliberate cooperation, or several overlapping causes.


PART IV — MARTINE MOÏSE’S QUESTIONS ABOUT MICHEL MARTELLY

7. Why the former first lady’s statements matter

Martine Moïse has publicly raised questions about Michel Martelly’s possible connection to her husband’s assassination.

Her statements must be understood in the context of her experience as a surviving victim and witness.

During the September 2026 proceedings involving Christian Emmanuel Sanon, she testified about her husband’s political conflicts.

She also discussed his disagreements with powerful business interests.

When questioned about Martelly and former Prime Minister Ariel Henry, she stopped short of directly accusing Martelly during that testimony, according to CBS Miami.

Instead, she indicated that she believed the investigation could provide answers concerning his role.

That distinction is important.

Martine Moïse’s suspicions are relevant to understanding the allegations surrounding the assassination, but they do not establish Martelly’s criminal responsibility.

Martelly has not been convicted of involvement in the assassination.

Nevertheless, the relationship between Martelly-era security personnel and Moïse’s presidential security apparatus remains an appropriate subject for investigation.

The central issue is whether political influence translated into operational control.

That question has not been resolved.


PART V — RADIO SIGNAL FM: WHEN MEDIA LEADERSHIP ENTERED PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

8. Mario Viaud and the Martelly administration

Radio Signal FM was one of Haiti’s most prominent broadcasters.

Its owner, Mario Viaud, became internationally recognized after the January 2010 earthquake, when the station remained on the air and provided essential information to the public.

The National Association of Broadcasters recognized Signal FM for its public service, identifying Viaud as the station’s owner.

But another chapter of Signal FM’s history deserves attention.

On August 29, 2011, Scoop FM published a report concerning the appointment of Signal FM journalist Joseph Lucien Jura as President Michel Martelly’s spokesperson.

The report identified Mario Viaud, Signal FM’s chief executive, as a security adviser to President Martelly.

It also identified Viaud’s son, Mario Viaud Jr., as another presidential security adviser.

These reported appointments created an unusual overlap between the leadership of a private radio station and the presidential security establishment.

The same Scoop FM article, however, reported tensions between Martelly and the Viaud family, including difficulties obtaining meetings with the president.

That detail complicates any suggestion of uninterrupted political cooperation.

Still, the historical relationship raises questions about the roles the advisers performed, their access to presidential security information, and whether their government responsibilities overlapped with their broadcasting interests.

9. Joseph Lucien Jura: From Signal FM to PHTK

Joseph Lucien Jura represents another direct connection between Signal FM and the Martelly political establishment.

Jura served as Signal FM’s Director of Information before becoming Martelly’s presidential spokesperson in 2011.

He subsequently entered electoral politics under the PHTK banner.

His candidacy for deputy in Arcahaie appeared on the 2015 electoral candidate list.

This was more than a journalist obtaining an ordinary government communications job.

Jura became a participant in the political organization associated with the president he had served.

The transition raises legitimate questions about the movement of influential media figures into partisan political institutions.

But it does not establish that Signal FM itself operated under PHTK control.

Nor does Jura’s former position establish that he was the Signal FM director who later contacted Michel Soukar on the night of Moïse’s assassination.

Those are separate questions.


PART VI — SCOOP FM AND THE BROADER POLITICAL-MEDIA NETWORK

10. Garry Pierre Paul Charles and the Signal FM connection

Scoop FM’s founder, Garry Pierre Paul Charles, previously served as Director of Information at Radio Signal FM.

He later established Scoop FM as a separate broadcasting organization.

This creates a professional connection between the two stations.

Scoop FM also maintained access to prominent political figures, including Martelly and Laurent Lamothe.

That access was not unusual for a major Haitian broadcaster.

However, the history of these relationships illustrates a broader feature of Haiti’s political-media environment.

Journalists, station owners, presidential advisers, and political spokespersons often operate within overlapping professional circles.

These networks may influence who receives interviews, government information, political appointments, and access to officials.

They may also create potential conflicts of interest.

But access to political leaders is not proof of editorial control, and professional relationships do not establish participation in criminal activity.

The relevant investigative question is whether these networks affected the circulation of sensitive government information, particularly during moments of national crisis.

That question brings us to Michel Soukar.


PART VII — MICHEL SOUKAR’S ACCOUNT OF THE ASSASSINATION NIGHT

11. The telephone calls Soukar says he missed

During an interview with Team Roudy, historian and political commentator Michel Soukar described how he learned that Jovenel Moïse had been assassinated.

According to the Kreyòl account supplied to Haiti Politic, Soukar said he had gone to bed around 8 p.m. on July 6, 2021.

He was exhausted.

He turned off his telephone and went to sleep.

When he woke around 5 a.m. the following morning, he switched on his telephone and discovered numerous missed calls.

Among them were calls from someone he described as a director at Radio Signal FM.

Soukar said he returned the call.

The individual asked where he had been.

Soukar answered that he had been sleeping.

The caller then informed him that Jovenel Moïse had been killed.

Soukar expressed disbelief.

The caller offered to send him photographs.

According to Soukar, that was how he learned of the assassination.

12. Why the timing matters

This account raises several questions.

First, who was the individual Soukar described as a director at Signal FM?

Second, at what time did that person begin calling?

Third, how did the caller learn about the assassination?

Fourth, who supplied the photographs?

And fifth, when were those photographs originally taken?

The distinction between these events is critical.

Soukar’s account does not establish that the Signal FM contact possessed photographs when the first calls were made.

It also does not establish that the calls began before the assassination or before news of the killing circulated publicly.

But the account identifies a potentially important witness to the early dissemination of information.

The original telephone records and image transmission history could help establish the sequence.

13. Could the photographs have originated within the PNH?

One possible investigative avenue concerns the Haitian National Police.

Police officers, investigators, presidential security personnel, and others who accessed the residence after the attack could potentially have obtained information or photographs.

It is therefore reasonable to investigate whether the images reached journalists through a police or security source.

However, no evidence presently establishes that the Signal FM contact obtained the photographs from the PNH, Dimitri Hérard, Joseph Félix Badio, or anyone associated with PHTK.

The source could also have been another journalist, an eyewitness, or an individual who received the images secondhand.

Identifying the original photographer and the transmission sequence would be essential.


PART VIII — SOUKAR’S EARLIER WARNING TO JOVENEL MOÏSE

14. The advice to resign

Soukar’s interview contains another significant statement.

He says that around September 2019, during a public radio appearance, he advised Jovenel Moïse to resign.

According to Soukar, he believed that remaining in office could lead to the president’s death.

This was approximately 22 months before the assassination.

The warning deserves examination within the political environment of 2019.

Haiti was experiencing intense political unrest, demands for Moïse’s resignation, and serious confrontations over presidential legitimacy.

Soukar’s statement could therefore reflect a political assessment of the danger facing a president who remained in office amid escalating unrest.

But another question deserves to be asked:

Was Soukar speaking only from his analysis of Haiti’s political crisis, or had he received information about specific threats against the president?

The available interview account does not establish that he possessed advance knowledge of the July 2021 assassination plot.

Nor does it establish that he warned Moïse privately.

Those distinctions matter.

A public warning that a president could be killed is not equivalent to knowledge of an organized assassination conspiracy.

Still, Soukar’s explanation of the warning—and the information on which he based it—would be valuable to understanding his assessment of the political dangers surrounding Moïse.


PART IX — THE TWO TIMELINES THAT MUST NOT BE CONFUSED

15. Political tensions and operational evidence

The investigation now involves two distinct timelines.

The first concerns the political environment.

It includes the Martelly presidency, the rise of PHTK, the election of Jovenel Moïse, disagreements within the political movement, and the continued presence of Martelly-era personnel in presidential institutions.

The second concerns the assassination operation.

It includes the recruitment of Colombian participants, the planning and financing of the conspiracy, Badio’s alleged operational role, the actions of presidential security officers, and the movement of information immediately after the attack.

These timelines may intersect through specific individuals or institutions.

But the existence of political relationships does not establish that those relationships caused or facilitated the assassination.

That connection must be demonstrated through communications, testimony, financial evidence, or other corroborated records.

For example, establishing that Dimitri Hérard served under Martelly before heading Moïse’s palace guard is relevant.

Establishing that Mario Viaud was reportedly a Martelly security adviser is also relevant.

But those facts do not establish that Viaud, Hérard, or Martelly coordinated with Badio.

Likewise, the early circulation of photographs through a journalist does not establish that the journalist knew about the operation beforehand.

The investigation must determine where the timelines actually intersect, rather than assuming that every political or professional connection belongs to the assassination conspiracy.


PART X — THE MIAMI TRIALS AND THE QUESTIONS STILL UNANSWERED

16. What federal prosecutors have established

The United States has pursued criminal cases against individuals accused of participating in the conspiracy to remove or kill Jovenel Moïse.

Four defendants were convicted in May 2026.

Other defendants previously pleaded guilty.

In September 2026, U.S. authorities transferred Joseph Félix Badio and 17 Colombian defendants from Haiti to Miami to face federal charges.

The Department of Justice identified Badio among the defendants charged in the alleged conspiracy.

The proceedings have produced evidence about financing, recruitment, operational planning, and the involvement of individuals in Haiti and South Florida.

But criminal responsibility must be determined individually.

The convictions of some participants do not automatically establish the guilt of every person mentioned during testimony.

17. What Sanon’s trial has added

Christian Emmanuel Sanon’s trial has brought further attention to the political ambitions of individuals involved in the conspiracy.

Testimony has examined plans to remove Moïse from power and replace him with another political figure.

By November 5, 2026, courtroom reporting described testimony from businessman Frederick Bergmann, a longtime associate of Sanon.

Bergmann discussed Sanon’s political ambitions and his understanding of the operation.

His testimony also illustrated how competing plans, political expectations, and allegedly misleading representations circulated among people associated with the conspiracy.

The distinction between an original kidnapping or removal plan and the later decision to kill Moïse remains important.

It is also central to understanding when different participants learned that the operation had become an assassination plot.

18. What Badio’s proceedings could reveal

Badio’s case could provide further evidence about the operational chain of command.

Among the most important issues are his alleged communications with Colombian participants, the movement of the attacking convoy, and the purported arrangements involving Haitian security personnel.

His proceedings may also address whether the attackers received inside information about the residence and security deployment.

But the outcome will depend on the evidence admitted, the credibility of witnesses, and the arguments presented by the defense.

Badio has denied wrongdoing.

As of November 8, 2026, his criminal responsibility in the U.S. proceedings has not been established by a conviction.


PART XI — TEN QUESTIONS HAITI STILL DESERVES ANSWERED

1. Who controlled presidential security?
Did Jovenel Moïse exercise effective authority over the USGPN and other units assigned to protect him?

2. Why did Dimitri Hérard remain in command?
What do appointment records, internal communications, and testimony reveal about the president’s relationship with his security chief?

3. Which presidential guards allegedly received payments?
Can prosecutors identify the officers, amounts, intermediaries, and financial transactions?

4. What was Joseph Félix Badio’s precise operational role?
Do telephone records, location evidence, and independent testimony corroborate Rivera’s account of Badio’s presence during the attack?

5. Who supplied the attackers with information about the residence?
Was the intelligence obtained through surveillance, insiders, or another source?

6. What did Michel Martelly know about the security problems surrounding Moïse?
Were concerns raised with the former president or individuals associated with his administration, and what documentary evidence exists?

7. Who was the Signal FM director who contacted Michel Soukar?
Was that individual serving in the station’s management in July 2021, or was Soukar referring to a former director?

8. Who took the first photographs of the assassinated president?
Can investigators reconstruct when the images were created, transmitted, and circulated?

9. Why did Soukar advise Moïse to resign in 2019?
Was his warning based on the broader political crisis, specific threats, or information from identifiable sources?

10. Did political divisions within PHTK affect the president’s security relationships?
What evidence, if any, connects those divisions to specific appointments, operational decisions, or failures of protection?


CONCLUSION — THE ASSASSINATION WAS AN OPERATION. THE SECURITY FAILURE REQUIRES ITS OWN ACCOUNTING.

Five years after Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, the Miami proceedings have helped explain how an international conspiracy developed and how armed participants reached the presidential residence.

But the prosecution of the attackers is only one part of the historical record.

The failure of the institutions responsible for protecting the president requires its own examination.

So do the political relationships that shaped those institutions.

The history of Michel Martelly’s political network, the presence of former Martelly-era personnel in Moïse’s security establishment, and the reported appointment of Radio Signal FM’s owner to a presidential security advisory role are all legitimate subjects for scrutiny.

Michel Soukar’s account introduces another question: How did sensitive information about the assassination reach a broadcaster’s contact network during the early morning hours of July 7?

The answers may prove entirely unrelated to the political divisions within PHTK.

They may reveal ordinary journalistic sourcing.

Or they may illuminate information channels that investigators have not fully explained publicly.

What matters is establishing the facts.

The central question is not whether everyone connected to Martelly, PHTK, Signal FM, or Scoop FM belonged to a single conspiracy. There is no established evidence supporting such a sweeping conclusion.

The question is whether the individuals responsible for protecting Haiti’s president fulfilled their duties—and whether anyone deliberately helped the attackers overcome that protection.

The testimony of Germán Alejandro Rivera García has made Joseph Félix Badio’s alleged operational role a central issue.

Martine Moïse’s testimony has underscored the apparent absence of the security personnel assigned to her family.

Michel Soukar’s account has identified a potentially important witness to the early circulation of assassination information.

Together, these accounts point toward three areas that deserve continued examination: the command structure of presidential security, the alleged coordination between conspirators and insiders, and the chain through which information about the killing reached the public.

For Haiti, the unresolved issue is not only who planned the assassination.

It is also why the president’s security failed—and whether every person who contributed to that failure has been identified and held accountable.

HAITI POLITIC — THE QUESTIONS REMAIN. THE EVIDENCE MUST LEAD.


SOURCES AND DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

1. U.S. Department of Justice — September 21, 2026
Elite FBI and HSI Team Transports 18 Defendants from Haiti to South Florida to Face Federal Charges in Assassination of Haitian President.
Official confirmation of the transfer of Joseph Félix Badio and Colombian defendants, and the expanded federal indictment.

2. CBS Miami — September 29, 2026
Former Haitian first lady weeps on stand in Miami, recounts moment her husband said they were going to die.
Reporting on Martine Moïse’s testimony during Christian Emmanuel Sanon’s trial.

3. Miami Herald courtroom reporting — 2026
Reporting on Germán Alejandro Rivera García’s testimony concerning Badio’s alleged role, the attacking convoy, and presidential security.

4. Scoop FM — August 29, 2011
Presse : Lucien Jura, porte-parole de la Présidence ?
Contemporaneous reporting identifying Joseph Lucien Jura as Signal FM’s Director of Information and describing Mario Viaud and Mario Viaud Jr. as presidential security advisers.

5. National Association of Broadcasters — March 24, 2010
Haiti’s Signal FM Radio to be Honored at NABEF’s Service to America Awards.
Independent documentation identifying Mario Viau as Signal FM’s owner.

6. Conseil Électoral Provisoire — May 14, 2015
Definitive list of legislative candidates. Relevant to Joseph Lucien Jura’s PHTK candidacy.

7. Team Roudy — Michel Soukar interview
Soukar’s account of advising Jovenel Moïse to resign and his description of receiving assassination-related information from someone associated with Signal FM. The precise interview timestamps and the caller’s identity require independent verification.

8. Miami Herald — November 5, 2026
Reporting on Frederick Bergmann’s testimony during Christian Emmanuel Sanon’s trial.

Editorial note: This investigation distinguishes established events, reported relationships, witness testimony, prosecution allegations, and unresolved hypotheses. Individuals accused of criminal conduct are presumed innocent unless proven guilty. No evidence presented here establishes that Michel Martelly, Mario Viaud, Joseph Lucien Jura, Garry Pierre Paul Charles, Michel Soukar, Radio Signal FM, or Scoop FM participated in the assassination conspiracy.