Inside two U.S. terrorism prosecutions, allegations of secret negotiations between Salvadoran officials and gang leaders, and the accountability questions surrounding El Salvador’s military involvement in Haiti.
HAITI POLITIC | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — LEGAL ANALYSIS
November 4, 2026
INTRODUCTION: THE FEDERAL COURT RECORDS BEHIND BUKELE’S WAR ON GANGS
President Nayib Bukele has built an international reputation around his government’s aggressive campaign against criminal gangs in El Salvador.
His security policies have attracted supporters who credit the government with dramatically reducing gang violence. Critics, meanwhile, have raised concerns about mass detention, due process, human rights, and the concentration of executive power.
But behind the international debate lies another story—one documented in criminal indictments filed by the United States Department of Justice.
Before Bukele became internationally associated with an uncompromising campaign against gangs, American federal prosecutors alleged that senior representatives of his government had secretly negotiated with MS-13 leaders.
Those allegations appear in a federal criminal case filed in the Eastern District of New York:
United States v. Arevalo-Chavez et al., Case No. 2:22-cr-00429-JMA-AYS.
The indictment describes meetings inside Salvadoran prisons, negotiations over prison privileges and extradition, and alleged arrangements that prosecutors said could benefit the governing Nuevas Ideas party.
A related prosecution, United States v. Henriquez et al., Case No. 2:20-cr-00577-JMA, traces the history of MS-13 leadership and its negotiations with successive Salvadoran governments.
Neither indictment charges President Bukele personally.
Nevertheless, the documents raise questions about the conduct of officials serving in his administration.
Those questions now have additional significance as Salvadoran security personnel participate in international efforts to confront armed gangs in Haiti.
The issue is not whether Haiti should fight criminal organizations. It is whether the governments and institutions participating in that fight are subject to adequate legal, financial, and operational accountability.
PART I — THE FIRST FEDERAL CASE: THE UNITED STATES TARGETS MS-13’S INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP
Case No. 2:20-cr-00577-JMA
United States v. Henriquez et al.
Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York
Original indictment filed: December 16, 2020
Presiding judge: Joan M. Azrack
The first case was brought against 14 alleged senior members of MS-13’s leadership structure, known as the Ranfla Nacional.
Among the defendants were:
- Borromeo Enrique Henriquez, also known as Diablito de Hollywood.
- Elmer Canales-Rivera, also known as Crook de Hollywood.
- Efrain Cortez, also known as Tigre de Park View.
- Cesar Humberto Lopez-Larios, also known as El Greñas de Stoners.
Federal prosecutors charged the defendants with offenses involving terrorism-related conspiracies, material support, terrorism financing, and narco-terrorism.
The indictment described MS-13 as a transnational organization whose leadership exercised influence over criminal operations in El Salvador, Mexico, and the United States.
Why the American government became involved
MS-13 was not simply a Salvadoran domestic security problem.
According to the indictment, its leadership directed or influenced criminal activities involving drug trafficking, extortion, and violence within the United States.
The organization’s international command structure created a basis for American federal prosecution.
The indictment alleged that gang leaders in Salvadoran prisons could communicate with members abroad, authorize violence, and influence the organization’s financial operations.
The United States was prosecuting MS-13 as an international criminal organization, not merely commenting on El Salvador’s domestic security policies.
The first important revelation: negotiations predated Bukele
The 2020 indictment also describes negotiations involving MS-13 and Salvadoran political actors before Bukele became president in 2019.
Beginning around 2012, according to prosecutors, gang leaders participated in arrangements involving political parties and government representatives.
These included alleged exchanges of reduced violence for improved prison conditions and other benefits.
This historical distinction is essential.
Negotiations between Salvadoran political authorities and gangs did not begin with Bukele’s presidency.
The federal record describes a longer pattern spanning different political administrations.
The question is whether similar arrangements continued after Bukele took office—and what the American prosecutors subsequently alleged.
Documentary source: United States v. Henriquez et al., Case No. 2:20-cr-00577-JMA, Document 1, particularly the sections addressing the Ranfla Nacional and its negotiations with political parties.
PART II — THE SECOND INDICTMENT: WHAT PROSECUTORS ALLEGED AFTER BUKELE’S 2019 ELECTION
Case No. 2:22-cr-00429-JMA-AYS
United States v. Arevalo-Chavez et al.
Original case filed: September 22, 2022
Indictment publicly unsealed: February 23, 2023
Relevant document: Document 18, 42 pages
This second prosecution is particularly important because it describes alleged negotiations following Bukele’s election.
The indictment charged 13 alleged MS-13 leaders.
But its most politically consequential allegations concern what prosecutors said occurred between gang leaders and Salvadoran government representatives.
Paragraph 35: The alleged secret prison meetings
On page 18, prosecutors alleged that following El Salvador’s February 2019 presidential election, MS-13 leaders met repeatedly with government representatives.
According to the indictment, meetings occurred inside the Zacatecoluca and Izalco prisons and at other locations.
Prosecutors alleged that the meetings were arranged by Salvadoran government and prison officials, including officials responsible for the national prison system and social reconstruction programs.
The indictment further alleged that government representatives sometimes concealed their identities.
It also described gang members allegedly entering prisons while disguising their identities and using official identification.
These allegations are significant because they concern the possible use of government-controlled facilities and administrative authority to facilitate contacts with criminal leaders.
However, the indictment is a charging document. Its allegations must not be presented as judicially established findings against officials who were not defendants.
Paragraph 36: What prosecutors alleged was being negotiated
Page 19 contains some of the indictment’s most consequential allegations.
According to federal prosecutors, MS-13 leaders sought:
Financial benefits. The indictment alleges negotiations involving economic advantages for the organization.
Control of territory. Prosecutors alleged that gang leaders sought arrangements concerning areas under their influence.
Less restrictive prison conditions. The alleged objective was to improve communication between incarcerated leaders and members outside prison.
Legislative and judicial concessions. Prosecutors described demands that could result in reduced sentences or early release.
Protection against extradition. MS-13 leaders allegedly sought assurances that Salvadoran authorities would not extradite them to the United States.
In exchange, prosecutors alleged that MS-13 leaders agreed to reduce publicly visible murders.
The indictment further alleges that some killings continued but were concealed through the disposal or hiding of victims’ bodies.
These are exceptionally serious allegations because they challenge the reliability of public security statistics when considered independently of broader evidence.
They do not establish that every reduction in Salvadoran homicides was fabricated.
They do establish that American prosecutors formally advanced a theory under which negotiated gang behavior could influence publicly reported security outcomes.
The political dimension: Nuevas Ideas
The indictment also alleged that MS-13 leaders agreed to use their political influence to encourage support for candidates belonging to Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party during the 2021 legislative elections.
This is the critical distinction between an ordinary prison-security negotiation and the allegations described in the federal case.
Prosecutors alleged that the negotiations involved not only security concessions but also potential political advantages.
Whether particular government officials knowingly entered unlawful arrangements, and whether those arrangements influenced election results, are separate questions requiring evidence.
The indictment itself does not convict the Salvadoran government or establish Bukele’s personal criminal liability.
Documentary source: United States v. Arevalo-Chavez et al., Document 18, paragraphs 35–36, pages 18–19.
PART III — THE EXTRADITION QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENED TO MS-13 LEADERS WANTED BY THE UNITED STATES?
The next part of the federal indictment concerns extradition.
This issue matters because extradition cooperation is a major component of international criminal justice.
Paragraph 37: American extradition requests
According to the indictment, the United States sought the extradition of several MS-13 leaders after the earlier terrorism indictment became public in January 2021.
Prosecutors alleged that gang leaders demanded protection against extradition.
This placed Salvadoran authorities in a politically and legally sensitive position.
Would the government cooperate with American prosecutors seeking to bring alleged gang leaders before U.S. courts?
Or would those requests be delayed, rejected, or otherwise frustrated?
A refusal to extradite is not automatically a criminal act. Extradition depends on treaties, domestic law, judicial procedures, and applicable legal protections.
But prosecutors alleged that resistance to extradition formed part of the negotiations with MS-13.
Paragraph 39: The Canales-Rivera episode
The indictment describes the case of Elmer Canales-Rivera.
According to prosecutors:
- INTERPOL published a Red Notice concerning Canales-Rivera in February 2021.
- Salvadoran authorities arrested him in June 2021.
- The United States formally requested his extradition in July 2021.
- Salvadoran authorities subsequently released him despite the pending American request.
This sequence raises questions about how the Salvadoran government handled requests involving internationally wanted gang leaders.
It is also important to distinguish the indictment’s account from any subsequent court findings concerning the legality of the release.
The indictment presents the prosecution’s allegations; it is not itself a judgment against the Salvadoran officials involved.
Documentary source: United States v. Arevalo-Chavez et al., Document 18, paragraphs 37–39, pages 19–20.
PART IV — THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT SANCTIONS SALVADORAN OFFICIALS
The federal indictments are not the only official American records concerning alleged negotiations with MS-13.
On December 8, 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions involving senior Salvadoran officials.
Two individuals are particularly relevant.
Osiris Luna Meza
Luna served as El Salvador’s vice minister of justice and director of prisons.
The Treasury Department alleged that he helped facilitate secret meetings involving imprisoned gang leaders.
Carlos Amílcar Marroquín Chica
Marroquín served as director of the government’s Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit.
Treasury alleged that he participated in organizing and facilitating negotiations with gang leaders.
The department described alleged arrangements involving benefits for criminal organizations.
These findings are relevant because the positions identified by Treasury correspond to the government functions described in the 2023 federal indictment.
That correspondence is significant, but it must not be confused with a criminal conviction.
Treasury sanctions are administrative measures imposed under legal authorities distinct from federal criminal prosecution.
A sanctions designation does not mean the designated individual has been convicted of a crime.
Likewise, the existence of sanctions against officials does not establish that Bukele personally committed a criminal offense.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 8, 2021, Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized Crime.
PART V — JOINT TASK FORCE VULCAN: THE BROADER AMERICAN INVESTIGATION
The federal prosecutions emerged from a broader American effort to investigate MS-13’s international leadership.
In 2019, the U.S. government established Joint Task Force Vulcan to coordinate federal investigations and prosecutions involving MS-13.
The initiative brought together federal prosecutors and law-enforcement agencies working on organized crime, terrorism-related offenses, and international criminal networks.
What investigative reporting later revealed
A June 2025 ProPublica investigation examined allegations that Salvadoran authorities had impeded American efforts to investigate MS-13 and its relationships with government officials.
The reporting described investigative activity concerning alleged negotiations, financial arrangements, and extradition interference.
It also raised questions about whether U.S. investigators had been able to pursue every relevant lead.
These reported investigative details should be distinguished from the allegations formally presented in federal indictments.
An investigative lead is not an indictment. An indictment is not a conviction. And an allegation concerning a government official does not automatically establish wrongdoing by the president.
Nevertheless, the combined documentary record demonstrates that American scrutiny of alleged government-gang contacts extended beyond political criticism.
It involved federal criminal investigations, court proceedings, extradition requests, and Treasury sanctions.
What remains unproven
The four court documents reviewed for this article do not establish that President Bukele personally directed negotiations with MS-13.
They also do not establish that he personally received criminal proceeds or ordered officials to obstruct American prosecutions.
Bukele’s government has denied negotiating with gangs.
Any responsible investigation must preserve that distinction.
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, February 23, 2023; ProPublica, June 12, 2025.
PART VI — WHY THE COURT DOCKETS MATTER
Haiti Politic obtained two federal indictments and their corresponding electronic court dockets.
The distinction between these documents matters.
An indictment explains the charges and allegations advanced by prosecutors.
A docket records procedural developments in the case.
Those developments can include motions, hearings, detention decisions, changes in counsel, dismissal requests, and other judicial actions.
The supplied docket for United States v. Arevalo-Chavez includes a government motion filed on April 1, 2025, seeking dismissal as to Arevalo-Chavez.
The docket also records subsequent defense responses and court orders concerning his detention and movement.
This is a reminder that the procedural history of a federal case can change substantially after the indictment becomes public.
A motion to dismiss is not, by itself, proof that every allegation in the indictment was false. Nor should a journalist assume that every original charge remains pending without reviewing later docket entries.
For an accurate account of the litigation, the relevant question is not simply what prosecutors alleged in 2023, but what happened to each defendant afterward.
The two supplied indictments provide the historical allegations. The dockets are necessary for understanding the subsequent legal proceedings.
PART VII — THE CONTRADICTION HAITI MUST EXAMINE
The allegations create a politically important contrast.
On one side stands Bukele’s international reputation as a leader associated with forceful action against organized crime.
On the other stands a U.S. federal documentary record describing alleged secret negotiations between senior Salvadoran government representatives and gang leaders.
These two realities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
A government can pursue aggressive law enforcement while officials within that government face allegations of improper negotiations or corruption.
The question is whether security outcomes are accompanied by transparent institutions, lawful conduct, and independent accountability.
This distinction matters for Haiti.
Haiti’s armed gangs have inflicted extensive harm on civilians, weakened public institutions, and contributed to a severe humanitarian and security crisis.
Haitians have a legitimate interest in effective measures against those organizations.
But the effectiveness of security operations cannot be evaluated solely through public statements, images of military deployments, or claims of success.
It must also be assessed through evidence concerning legality, civilian protection, financing, command responsibility, and long-term institutional results.
PART VIII — WHAT THIS MEANS FOR SALVADORAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN HAITI
1. The GSF is internationally authorized, but it is not a UN-commanded peacekeeping mission
On September 30, 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2793, authorizing the transition from the Multinational Security Support mission to the Gang Suppression Force.
The resolution established an international framework for security operations in Haiti.
It also provided for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti, known as UNSOH, to furnish logistical and operational support.
However, the GSF is not a conventional UN-commanded peacekeeping force.
Its operational command is assigned to its own Force Commander, while participating governments and international partners have distinct responsibilities.
El Salvador is among the countries participating in the GSF’s international partnership arrangements.
Therefore, describing every Salvadoran military activity in Haiti as a personal operation directed by Bukele would be misleading without evidence establishing that command relationship.
At the same time, participation in the GSF does not exempt a contributing government from scrutiny.
2. Why the American investigations matter
The U.S. investigations into alleged dealings between Salvadoran officials and MS-13 do not establish that Salvadoran forces are committing crimes in Haiti.
They do, however, provide a documented reason to examine whether the security partnership has adequate safeguards.
Those safeguards should address the risk of corruption, unauthorized financial arrangements, improper contact with armed groups, and interference with investigations.
This is particularly important in Haiti, where the effectiveness of security assistance depends on cooperation among international personnel, the Haitian National Police, the armed forces, and judicial authorities.
3. Due diligence must extend beyond military capability
When a government contributes security personnel to an international mission, the evaluation should not be limited to equipment, training, or operational experience.
It should also examine:
- The legal status and mandate of deployed personnel.
- The chain of command and rules governing the use of force.
- Financial oversight and equipment accountability.
- Procedures for reporting civilian casualties and misconduct.
- Human-rights compliance and disciplinary mechanisms.
- Cooperation with Haitian judicial authorities.
Security assistance requires institutional accountability as well as operational capacity.
4. The importance of the UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
Resolution 2793 specifically addresses human-rights compliance.
It requires participating states to maintain standards of conduct and discipline and calls for mechanisms to investigate and publicly report violations or abuses.
The resolution also requires support provided by UNSOH to comply with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.
This means that questions about accountability are not merely political demands.
They are directly connected to the international framework governing the mission.
The allegations in the American MS-13 cases are not proof that Salvadoran contingents fail these standards.
They are relevant background when considering how rigorously those standards should be implemented.
PART IX — WHO IS FINANCING THE OPERATIONS?
One of the most important unanswered questions concerns the financing of international security operations in Haiti.
Resolution 2793 provides for voluntary contributions to support personnel costs and establishes mechanisms for logistical and operational assistance.
UNSOH’s support responsibilities include transportation, accommodation, medical services, fuel, equipment support, and other operational requirements.
This creates several separate financial questions.
First: What portion of Salvadoran participation is financed directly by El Salvador?
Second: What portion is supported through international contributions or mission arrangements?
Third: What equipment, transportation, intelligence, or other assistance is provided by the United States or additional partners?
Fourth: Which institutions audit these expenditures?
Fifth: What safeguards prevent diversion, procurement irregularities, or unauthorized expenditures?
The reviewed court records do not answer these questions.
They also do not establish that funds allocated to Haiti’s security mission have been misused.
That is precisely why financial transparency is necessary.
PART X — TEN QUESTIONS HAITI DESERVES ANSWERED
1. To the Salvadoran government: What is the exact legal basis for the deployment of Salvadoran military and security personnel to Haiti?
2. To GSF leadership: How many Salvadoran personnel are formally assigned to the mission, and what responsibilities do they perform?
3. To the Haitian authorities: What agreements govern the presence, jurisdiction, privileges, and obligations of Salvadoran personnel operating in Haiti?
4. To the United States: What financial, logistical, intelligence, or equipment assistance is being provided in connection with Salvadoran participation?
5. To the United Nations: What human-rights due diligence has been conducted concerning participating contingents and their command structures?
6. To President Bukele: How does your government respond today to the allegations concerning negotiations with MS-13 that appear in the 2023 federal indictment?
7. To Salvadoran authorities: What internal investigations, if any, examined the conduct of officials identified in the U.S. Treasury sanctions announcement?
8. To GSF leadership: What independent procedures exist to investigate allegations of civilian harm, misconduct, or unauthorized operations?
9. To the Haitian government: How will the mission strengthen Haitian institutions rather than create long-term dependence on foreign security personnel?
10. To all participating governments: Will you publish sufficient information on financing, command responsibility, operational objectives, and measurable results to permit independent public oversight?
These questions do not presume criminal wrongdoing.
They establish a framework for evaluating a security mission operating on Haitian territory.
PART XI — THE LARGER LESSON: FIGHTING GANGS AND BUILDING A STATE ARE NOT THE SAME THING
El Salvador and Haiti have different political institutions, security structures, criminal networks, and historical circumstances.
Their experiences cannot be treated as interchangeable.
A policy that produces a measurable security improvement in one country may encounter different obstacles in another.
The U.S. federal indictments illustrate why the relationship between governments and criminal organizations deserves sustained scrutiny.
They describe allegations that gang leaders attempted to influence political authorities through negotiations, violence, and electoral leverage.
For Haiti, the central institutional challenge is broader than defeating particular gang leaders.
It includes rebuilding the capacity of the Haitian National Police, strengthening criminal investigations, protecting witnesses, prosecuting organized crime, combating illicit weapons trafficking, and restoring public confidence in the justice system.
Foreign assistance can contribute to these objectives.
But lasting security depends on whether Haitian institutions can eventually perform these functions independently and lawfully.
CONCLUSION — BEFORE CELEBRATING BUKELE’S ROLE IN HAITI, EXAMINE THE AMERICAN COURT RECORDS
The federal indictments examined by Haiti Politic contain serious allegations concerning the relationship between MS-13 and Salvadoran government representatives.
The first case documents a longer history of alleged gang negotiations involving successive political administrations.
The second describes alleged secret meetings, financial and prison-related concessions, extradition disputes, and potential political benefits following Bukele’s 2019 election.
The U.S. Treasury Department separately sanctioned senior Salvadoran officials over alleged dealings with criminal organizations.
These are documented government actions.
But the evidence must be described accurately.
The reviewed indictments do not charge Bukele personally, do not establish his criminal guilt, and do not prove misconduct by Salvadoran forces operating in Haiti.
They do establish a substantial public record that warrants scrutiny when evaluating international security cooperation involving his administration.
Haiti’s people deserve protection from armed gangs.
They also deserve a government and international partners willing to explain who commands foreign personnel, who finances their operations, what legal authority governs their presence, and how violations will be investigated.
Security must not become an excuse to suspend accountability.
The ultimate measure of international assistance should not be the popularity of a foreign president or the number of military operations announced.
It should be whether Haitians become safer, whether civilians are protected, and whether Haitian institutions emerge stronger.
Haiti’s security must ultimately be secured through accountable Haitian institutions—not permanent dependence on foreign military power.
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES
Federal court records
- United States v. Henriquez et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 2:20-cr-00577-JMA, Document 1, filed December 16, 2020.
- United States v. Arevalo-Chavez et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 2:22-cr-00429-JMA-AYS, Document 18, publicly filed February 23, 2023.
- PACER docket reports for both cases, obtained November 4, 2026.
U.S. government sources
- U.S. Department of Justice, Three of the Highest-Ranking MS-13 Leaders in the World Arrested on Terrorism and Racketeering Charges, February 23, 2023.
- U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized Crime, December 8, 2021.
International legal framework
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2793 (2025), September 30, 2025.
- United Nations Support Office in Haiti, official mandate and operational support documentation.
Additional investigative reporting
- ProPublica, How El Salvador’s Government Impeded a U.S. Probe of MS-13, June 12, 2025.
Editorial disclosure: This investigation distinguishes federal prosecutorial allegations, administrative sanctions, reported investigative findings, and established court actions. Neither an indictment nor an administrative sanctions designation should be represented as a criminal conviction of a person who was not prosecuted or found guilty.
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